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Visually impaired voters in Denmark are unable to vote privately in state elections.
Our study examined voting systems that could improve voter privacy for the visually
impaired in Denmark. We also investigated different methods of voting that would
allow the visually impaired to participate in elections within organizations. Through
interviews with blind and sighted voters and with members of the Danish government,
we determined which voting systems would be most acceptable for use in Denmark.
Based on our findings, we concluded that the Danish Association of the Blind should
push for the implementation of electronic voting machines that print paper ballots. We
have also created a list of best practices for making organizational elections accessible
to the visually impaired.
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1 Introduction
The right to vote with a secret ballot is essential to upholding the legitimacy of a Demo-
cratic election. Without the privacy of a secret ballot, voters can feel intimidated or even
embarrassed when voting. The knowledge that others will know one’s vote in an election
can lead to skewed election results and a general mistrust in the electoral system (Evans &
Paul, 2004). In order to prevent fraudulent results from occurring, Article 21 of the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “the will of the people shall be
the basis of the authority of government” and that this shall be determined “by secret ballot
or by equivalent free voting procedures.” Clearly, the United Nations views voter privacy as
a central pillar of the political institution of Democracy.
Unfortunately, in many developed nations, the visually impaired are unable to vote by
a secret ballot. One such nation is Denmark, which has faced significant challenges in
implementing an accessible voting system for the visually impaired. Currently, the only
method by which a visually impaired person may vote in Denmark is by having a government
official read off, record, and cast the ballot for the visually impaired voter (MISA, 2009).
Due to this requirement that a visually impaired person must tell their vote to a stranger,
many visually impaired voters in Denmark feel that their privacy rights are being violated
(Heilbrunn, 2011).
The implementation of a secure and private voting scheme for the visually impaired is
a global problem and it is not surprising to find that there have been many, sometimes
successful, attempts to implement voting systems that are usable by the visually impaired.
For example, in 2002 the United States government enacted the Help America Voter Act
(hava), mandating that all polling sites in the US provide at least one handicapped accessible
voting station (VisionAware, 2010). This legislation has led to widespread adoption of
electronic voting systems that provide the visually impaired with a private and independent
method of voting (PR Newswire, 2004). Although the entirety of the US electoral system is
not yet able to provide a secret ballot for every visually impaired voter, significant progress
has been made since the passing of hava.
Another system of voting that has been relatively successful in providing privacy to the
visually impaired has been telephonic voting. Telephone based systems have been used
successfully throughout Australia, where they were first implemented in 2007. Indeed, the
telephonic voting system generated extremely positive user feedback, with most visually
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impaired voter finding it very appealing (Hutchinson, 2010). Furthermore, the costs of
maintaining the call centers that record the telephone votes are relatively low compared to
electronic voting systems (Hutchinson, 2010).
While there have been successes in some countries with voting systems that allow visually
impaired voters to maintain their privacy, other countries have found some visually impaired
accessible voting systems unacceptable. For example, Germany and France have attempted
to integrate electronic voting machines into their electoral systems only to find that electronic
machines were too expensive, sometimes inaccurate, and prone to tampering (Evans & Paul,
2004). Additionally, because the machines do not produce a paper trail, there have been
voter trust issues (Evans & Paul, 2004). Moreover, even private, secure systems such as
the telephonic system can be perceived as problematic by visually impaired voters because
the system still does not allow them to vote in the same manner as sighted voters. This is
a problem because, if visually impaired voters are unable to cast their ballot in a method
similar to non-impaired voters, then they may feel like second class citizens (DAB, 2011).
Although there are many methods of voting that make private voting a reality for the
visually impaired, Denmark has yet to implement one. The Danish Ministry of the Interior
has stated that they are reluctant to look into any of these systems because they believe
that there exists no accessible system that provides reliable election results and that will be
accepted and trusted by the Danish voters (MISA, 2009).
Given that reliable and visually impaired accessible voting systems have been successfully
implemented in other countries, it is necessary that such voting systems first be researched
to determine how the challenges associated with each system were overcome and why each
system may or may not be acceptable for use in Denmark. Additionally, it appears that no
significant study on the possibility of implementing an accessible voting system in Denmark
has actually been conducted. This seems to further support the necessity of a study examin-
ing different accessible voting systems and their likelihood of being successfully implemented
in Denmark.
The primary focus of this project is to recommend a method of voting to the Danish
Association of the Blind that allows the visually impaired to vote in private while still
addressing the desires of the Danish government. We will do this through an extensive
analysis on our stakeholders, such as the visually impaired and the Danish government, in
order to determine what qualities they desire in a voting system. We will then present
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our research of different voting schemes used throughout the world that allow the visually
impaired to vote in private. By comparing the attributes of each voting system to the
criteria set forth by our stakeholders, we will then critique each voting system. Finally, we
will present the method of voting that we believe will be able to successfully implemented
and allow the visually impaired to vote in private.
3
2 Background
In this section, we will start by presenting an overview of some of the political rights guaran-
teed to all individuals. Through two of the most well-known declarations on human rights,
we will explain why it is necessary to protect the political rights of the visually impaired.
We will then discuss the inadequacies of the current Danish election system regarding the
visually impaired and their right to privacy while voting. Following the discussion on visu-
ally impaired voting in Denmark, we will describe the Danish electoral process as a whole
in an attempt to explain why the system is the way it is. As there are many methods of
voting around the world that allow the visually impaired to vote in private, we will briefly
describe each voting system as a basis for a more detailed analysis in the Results section of
this report. Finally, as it is necessary that we know who has a vested interest in our project,
we will introduce the organizations and groups of people that we have deemed as important
stakeholders in our project.
2.1 Political Rights
As this project is focused on the political rights of the visually impaired, it is necessary that
we look at legislation that guarantees the visually impaired these rights. Though there are
numerous international declarations and treaties detailing what liberties must be protected,
we will only look at two of these in detail. The first is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, commonly referred to as the udhr. The udhr outlines the basic human rights that
are to be enjoyed by all individuals. The second document, the Convention on Rights of
Persons with Disabilities (crpd), is a more recent one. The crpd states that the rights
detailed in the udhr must also be afforded to those with disabilities. In some instances,
especially when discussing the political rights of the disabled, the crpd is more specific than
the udhr, explaining how the rights are to be guaranteed. As both of these documents are
of global significance, we will provide a detailed analysis into why they are important to our
project.
2.1.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Drafted by the United Nations in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (udhr)
defines the basic “human rights and fundamental freedoms” that need to be protected by
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members of the United Nations. Though it is a non-binding document, the udhr has since
become the most prominent document detailing the rights of the individual. Indeed, the
udhr has been used as the basis for many legally binding treaties and declarations, such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (iccpr).
While the udhr does not explicitly prescribe nor define democracy, the indication that
members of the UN must accept democratic ideals is clearly present in Article 21. Article 21
of the udhr details the basic political rights that must be recognized in order to maintain a
legitimate government, stating that:
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly
or through freely chosen representatives
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this
will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent
free voting procedures.
Though it is split into three sections, there are two main ideas present in Article 21.
The first is the right to participation, stating that everyone can participate in the political
affairs of their government, either by voting for someone to represent them, or by directly
participating as a representative. The second is the right to voter privacy during such
elections. In the following sections, we will discuss the importance of both of these rights to
ensuring the legitimacy of a democratic state.
Right to Participate
The right to partake in the political affairs of one’s own country is one of the central principles
of democracy. The right to participation embodies the idea that everyone is able to play
a part in the decision making of one’s government and that no citizen should be excluded
from making their voice heard. It is meant to ensure that each citizen’s views are fairly
represented, and that everyone is able to be a member of the body politic.
While this involvement generally comes in the form of voting for representatives or refer-
enda in state elections, this is not to only way one is able to influence the political activities
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of their country. Indeed, Article 21(1) states that everyone should not only be able to vote
for representatives, but may become a representative themselves. This means that anyone
is able to appear on the ballot and be elected to public office.
The ability to run for public office is essential to the legitimacy of a government (House,
2011). By only allowing certain candidates or parties to run in an election, a government can
control the outcome of an election by predetermining every candidate on the ballot. This type
of electoral rigging can often be seen in countries where dictators “validate” the legitimacy of
their power through “democratic” elections where they are the only candidate to appear on
the ballot. The Soviet Union commonly employed this tactic in their elections by preselecting
the candidates to appear on the ballot such that only members of the Communist party could
be voted for. It comes as no surprise then, that when nearly 100% of the votes cast were for
the Communist Party, the Soviet Union often triumphed this outcome as evidence that its
citizens were content with their government.
Article 21(1) and (2) are meant to safeguard against elections like those in the Soviet
Union. Indeed, they were written to ensure that elections would be conducted in a free and
fair manner by guaranteeing that any candidate may appear on the ballot. The right to
participate in an election, either through voting or by being represented on the ballot, is
integral to the democratic tradition. Without it, governments are free to abuse their power
to manipulate the results of an election.
Right to a Secret Ballot
The ability to participate in an election means little, however, if voters are still intimidated
or otherwise forced into voting for a particular candidate or party. In order to prevent voter
intimidation from occurring, Article 21(3) of the udhr makes it clear that the legitimacy of a
government shall be determined by the people through free and fair elections. In particular,
Article 21(3) states that these elections “shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free
voting procedures.” Through Article 21(3), the United Nations clearly presents voter privacy
as an essential political right.
While the concept of voting privacy has existed since Ancient Greece, legally mandated
secret ballots are a much more recent phenomenon (Saalfeld, 1995). The first standardized
secret ballot, or so called Australian ballot, was first implemented in Australia during the
mid-1850’s. Since then, the secret ballot has spread throughout the world and is considered,
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along with the right to participate in elections, an “indisputable legal principle” in modern
democratic states (Buchstein, 2010). The presence of a secret ballot has undoubtedly become
a fundamental measurement in the freedom and fairness of governments throughout the world
(Dahl, 1998).
Without a secret ballot, voters are open to intimidation from outside forces. Such is the
case in many autocratic countries where voter privacy is not respected, where voters fear
repercussions for voting against the party in power. For instance, in Syria, where the right to
a secret ballot is not respected, it is common for those who vote against the ruling party in
election to be imprisoned (George, 2003). A similar situation occurred in the 2010 Burmese
election, where voters were coerced into voting for the military junta to stay in power under
threat of land confiscation (Davies, 2010). And while voting by secret ballot in was an option
in East Germany from 1949-1989, it was not mandated by law. This led to the secret ballot
becoming little more than a political gimmick, as voters were often intimidated into making
their vote public (Buchstein, 2010). Faced with the threat of persecution, many dissenting
voters often voted for the least dangerous choice, even though it may have been unfavorable
to them. Indeed, the presence of a secret ballot as an option is not enough; secret ballots
must be mandated in order to help ensure that elections are being conducted fairly.
Requiring that all ballots be secret is not only done to protect the voter. If one has
the ability to prove how they voted, they are then able to sell their vote in exchange for
personal gain. As economist and Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling stated, “The mandatory
secret ballot is a scheme to deny the voter any means of proving which way he voted. Being
stripped of his power to prove how he voted, he is stripped of his power to be intimidated
(Schelling, 1981).” While voters are free and able to make their vote known to as many
people as they wish, the voters have no method of verifying their claim, and thus possibly
compromising the fairness of an election (Buchstein, 2010).
Indeed, a mandatory secret ballot is often used one the standards by which international
institutions evaluate the legitimacy of elections (House, 2011). The global recognition of a
voter’s right to privacy is evidenced by the numerous declarations and legal documents put
forth by the international community. Article 21(3) of the udhr is supported by Article
25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stating that votes “shall be
held by secret ballot” in order to guarantee “the free expression of the will of the electors.”
Within Europe, the Copenhagen Document, among other things, that it is the duty of the
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government to “ensure that votes are cast be secret ballot.” The European Commission
summarized the sentiment of all these acts in their Compendium of International Standards
stating that, “The element of a secret vote is quite clear the voter should cast his vote in
secret. Nobody else should be able to see how the voter votes (European Commission, 2009)”
Clearly, the international community views the right to a secret ballot as a basic human right
central to democratic institutions.
2.1.2 UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Supporting the belief that basic rights must be protected for all persons, many members
of the United Nations, including Denmark, signed the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (crpd). Ratified in May of 2008, the crpd states that
all human rights are to be guaranteed to all individuals, regardless of their disability. The
crpd reiterates many of the rights mentioned in the udhr, stating that provisions must be
made to ensure that such rights can be enjoyed by those with any kind of disability, including
visual impairment.
Indeed, the Article 29 of the crpd echoes many of the political rights mentioned in
Article 21 of the udhr. Article 29 of the crpd discusses the rights of disabled people to
participate in political and public life, stating that, “States Parties shall guarantee to persons
with disabilities political rights and the opportunity to enjoy them on an equal basis with
others” Article 29(a) in particular, outlines what each signatory must do in order to protect
the political rights of disabled individuals, and has been quoted in its entirety below:
Ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and fully participate in politi-
cal and public life on an equal basis with others, directly or through freely chosen
representatives, including the right and opportunity for persons with disabilities
to vote and be elected, inter alia, by:
1. Ensuring that voting procedures, facilities and materials are appropriate,
accessible and easy to understand and use;
2. Protecting the right of persons with disabilities to vote by secret ballot in
elections and public referendums without intimidation, and to stand for elec-
tions, to effectively hold office and perform all public functions at all levels
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of government, facilitating the use of assistive and new technologies where
appropriate;
3. Guaranteeing the free expression of the will of persons with disabilities as
electors and to this end, where necessary, at their request, allowing assis-
tance in voting by a person of their own choice;
Both the right to participate in the political affairs, as well as the right to a secret ballot,
are explicitly mentioned in Article 29(a). Furthermore, it states that actions must be taken
to ensure that all parts of the voting process, including the procedure and the materials
used, are accessible to persons with disabilities. Article 29 notes that new technologies may
be required to allow disabled voters to cast their vote in private, however, and that it is
the responsibility of the government to provide the disabled voters with such technologies.
While this does not mean that a government must overhaul its entire electoral process, the
government must provide disabled voters with a method of voting that allows them to vote
in private.
Article 29 goes on to state that, if the disabled voter wishes, they may be assisted by a
third party. It is important to note, however, that Article 29 makes it clear that this third
party is to be selected by the voter themselves. This implies that nobody but the voter, not
even the government, can decide who is to assist the voter in filling out their ballot. This
stipulation is important, because it guarantees that untrusted individuals or strangers to the
voter are not influencing their vote. Without the requirement that they choose who is to
assist them, a disabled voter, may not place their trust in the electoral process.
2.2 Visually Impaired Voting in Denmark
From the multiple declarations and conventions discussed in the previous section, it is clear
that voter privacy is of the utmost importance, even for the disabled. However, visually
impaired voters in Denmark are currently unable to vote by a secret ballot in governmental
elections. The only method of voting currently used in Denmark is the paper ballot. In
order to fill out and cast their vote under the current system, a visually impaired voter in
Denmark requires the assistance of a third party. This system of voting inherently violates
the blind voter’s right to privacy. Below, we will describe the numerous challenges that
a Danish visually impaired voter must face when voting with the current voting process.
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Furthermore, we will discuss how the current voting process for visually impaired voters
came about, and what its implications are with regards to voter privacy.
2.2.1 The Danish Ballot
The Danish ballot, an example of which is shown in Figure 1 , is a traditional paper ballot
that has remained relatively unchanged for over 100 years. In order to vote, the voter simply
Figure 1: Sample Danish Ballot (Trinity College Dublin)
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places an “X” next to the candidate or party of their choice. While this may seem like a
straightforward and trivial task for sighted voters, this system has several aspects that can
make voting on Election Day a tedious task.
First, ballot is only available in printed paper form. While a partially sighted voter may
be able to use a magnifying glass to read the ballot, it is nearly impossible for a blind voter
to vote without the assistance of another individual. This lack of an accessible ballot or
technologies to assist the voter results in the voter’s right to privacy being compromised, as
a third party is able to see who the blind voter votes for.
Second, the Danish ballot can be rather long. Instead of having a single nominee rep-
resent each political party, there can be numerous candidates running under a single party.
Furthermore, Denmark’s body politic is composed of multiple political parties. As voters
have the option of voting for either a person or a ballot will often consist of approximately
70 different possible choices (Gallagher, 2009). This length and complexity makes it difficult
for visually impaired Danes to browse through the ballot and make a selection without hav-
ing to constantly ask for their aide to re-read the names, which can lead to confusion and
frustration. Furthermore, the complexity of the ballots makes some assistive technologies,
such as printing the ballot in Braille, unfeasible, as the resulting ballot would be exceedingly
long.
2.2.2 A Lack of Privacy
The Parliamentary Election Act of Denmark stipulates how elections are to be conducted in
Denmark. The original Elections Act, passed in 1987, included voting procedures for those
citizens who were unable to vote without the assistance of a third party due to a disability,
including visual impairment. This act stated that, in the case of such a disability, two
election officials would assist the voter when marking and casting their ballot (MISA, 2009).
The Election Act did, offer provisions for visually impaired voters, stating that they could
select a trusted friend, family member, or significant other to enter the polling booth with
them rather than the two election officials. Although the requirement that someone assist the
blind voter in casting their ballot violates the voter’s right to privacy, many visually impaired
voters were content with this requirement. Indeed, while being able to vote privately and
independently would be more ideal, many blind voters felt that the ability to choose who
was to assist them in voting provided an adequate amount of privacy within the constraints
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of the Danish voting system.
In 2009, the Danish Parliament passed a new Election Act that, among other changes,
redefined the process by which voting was to be carried out for disabled persons (MISA,
2009). The 2009 Election Act no longer makes any distinction between visually impaired
and other disabled voters. Subsequently, visually impaired voters must now comply with the
requirement that election officials be present at the marking of the ballot. While a visually
impaired voter is able to replace one of the election officials with a trusted individual of their
choice, there will still be an election official watching them mark their ballot. Preliminary
background research has not suggested any reason for this change in voting procedure other
than that it places all disabled persons on an equal footing. While the concept of treating
all disabled people as equals may seem just, this is not the case when doing so limits the
rights of one of the involved parties.
Indeed, the requirement that two strangers be told who the voter is selecting has caused
many visually impaired voters, as well as the Danish Association of the Blind, to feel that
their right to voter privacy is being infringed upon (Heilbrunn, 2011). This argument is
validated by the fact that the requirement that a visually impaired voter must tell their vote
to an untrusted stranger is in direct violation of the udhr and crpd.
Other than being required to tell their vote to two government officials, there have been
many other complaints brought up against the current voting procedure. For example, some
visually impaired voters have complained that forcing three people into the tiny voting booth
creates an uncomfortable environment to vote in. Also, many visually impaired voters have
expressed concerns over the lack of sound insulation in the voting booths. As the visually
impaired voter is required to speak the answer to the two election officials, the vote can
easily be overheard by someone outside the voting booth. Finally, the election officials at
the polling station are often members of their local communities. Therefore, it is possible
that the official assisting the visually impaired voter with their vote may know the voter.
This could cause the voter to feel pressured to vote in one way or another.
2.3 The Danish Electoral System
In order to understand the roots of the problem of visually impaired voting in Denmark, it
is necessary that the Danish electoral system be understood. Denmark is a constitutional
monarchy that follows a parliamentary system of rule. As is common with many parlia-
12
mentary systems, there are a multiple major parties that appear on the Danish ballot each
election. While having more parties to choose from does increase the likelihood that a voter
will find a candidate or party that adequately represents the voter’s views, it also result in a
more complicated electoral system than simply determining which party has the most votes.
The Danish electoral system is notable for its high level of transparency throughout the
electoral process. This transparency has led many Danish voters, as well as the government,
to place a great deal of trust in the current electoral process. This socially ingrained trust
has made it difficult to implement a newer, more visually impaired accessible system.
In this section, we provide a brief explanation of the Danish parliamentary system, in-
cluding how each parliamentary seat is allocated to a particular party or candidate. We also
present an overview of the electoral process in Denmark, from the point when the Prime
Minister first calls for an election, to when the last vote is counted and the results are
announced.
2.3.1 The Parliamentary System
Like many European nations, Denmark’s political system is a parliamentary one, that is,
the executive branch is chosen by a democratically elected legislative branch. An interesting
aspect of the parliamentary system is that there are generally multiple political parties
involved. Due to the larger number of political parties, it is rare that any one party will
succeed in gaining a majority of the votes. It is therefore necessary that parties with similar
values form coalitions in order to form a government. Furthermore, a party only needs to
receive 2% of the nationwide vote to be guaranteed representation in parliament. This allows
a larger number of small parties to be represented than one would see in a two-party system,
such as in the United States.
Denmark’s parliament, known as the Folketing, is made up of 179 ministers, 175 of
which come directly from Denmark, with the other 4 split between Greenland and the Faroe
Islands. The 175 Danish seats available to parliament are allocated through a two-tiered
system based upon the election results in Denmark’s electoral districts. These districts are
composed of three electoral provinces that are further divided into a total of ten multimember
constituencies.
The ministers are elected to parliament in order to represent the views of these con-
stituencies, similar to how congressmen are elected in the United States to serve the needs
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of their voting districts. Thus, the people appearing on the ballot vary from constituency
to constituency. This helps to ensure that each region of Denmark is being accurately and
proportionally represented in parliament.
Of the 175 seats, 135 are “constituency seats” divided among the ten constituencies,
while the remaining 40 are “compensatory seats” allocated by the overall voting totals.
Specifically, the 135 “constituency seats” are apportioned according to the d’Hondt formula.
An example of how this process works can be seen in Table 1. In the simplified example
in Table 1, let us assume that there are eight seats available to the constituency and four
parties to choose from. The number of votes each party received can be seen in the “Votes
Received” column. According to the d’Hondt formula, these total vote numbers are then
divided by 2, 3, 4, etc. and placed in their respective party’s rows below each divisor. Seats
are then distributed according to the highest eight values among the resulting quotients. In
the case of Table 1, the highest eight numbers are boldfaced for clarity. This means that
Party A would receive three constituency seats, Parties B and C would each receive two
seats, and Party D would be left with the remaining seat.
Table 1: Sample Distribution of Seats Through d’Hondt Formula
Divisors
Parties: Votes Received 2 3 4 Seats Obtained
Party A 120000 60000 40000 30000 3
Party B 90000 45000 30000 22500 2
Party C 100000 50000 33333 25000 2
Party D 60000 30000 20000 12500 1
Once the constituency seats are decided, the “compensatory seats” are then allocated
in order to ensure proportional representation of the parties. A sample calculation of this
allocation can be seen in Table 2, taken from the Danish Ministry of the Interior. In this
example, the overall number for each party is divided by the total nationwide number of
votes. This number is then multiplied by 175 in order to determine how the 175 (third
column) seats would be allocated according to a proportional distribution. The total number
of constituency seats awarded to each party is then subtracted from this number to generate
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Total 3428858 175.000 = 175 135 40
Social Democratic
Party
881037 44.966 = 45 41 4
Social Liberal Party 177161 9.042 = 9 3 6
Conservative Party 359904 18.343 = 18 11 7
Socialist People’s
Party
450975 23.017 = 23 19 4
Danish People’s Party 479532 24.474 = 25 20 5
Liberals 908472 46.366 = 46 40 6
New Alliance 97295 4.966 = 5 0 5
Unity List 74982 3.827 = 4 1 3
the number of compensatory seats to be awarded (fifth column).
2.3.2 The Electoral Process
The Danish electoral process begins when the prime minister dissolves parliament and calls
for an election, an action that must occur within four years following the previous election.
After the election is called for, an election date will be set and preparations will begin
(Folketing, 2011). When it comes to the actual polling, the responsibility of carrying out the
voting rests primarily with municipalities.
The municipalities are responsible for setting up polling booths and providing voters with
necessary voting materials, such as pencils and ballots. Municipalities are also responsible for
ensuring that polling stations are staffed with well-prepared election officials. These election
officials are tasked with ensuring that the election is carried out fairly and efficiently, as well
as assisting those voters with any questions or challenges they have while voting.
Upon arriving at a polling station a voter will verify their identity, either through the
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Figure 2: Flowchart of Danish Electoral Process
presentation of a poll card, or by giving the election official their name, address, and date of
birth so that it may be checked against public records. Once the voter’s identity is confirmed,
they receive a ballot for the election. The voter takes the ballot to a voting booth, shuts the
curtains, and fills out their vote in private. Once they have finished filling out their ballot,
the voter exits the booth and places their ballot into a sealed ballot box, and then exits the
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polling station (Gallagher, 2009).
Denmark has a very in-depth system for counting votes cast during elections, the process
of which is outlined in Figure 2. The preliminary counting process occurs as soon as the
polls close. This preliminary count entails election officials counting the total number of
votes each party received, regardless of whether or not it was a party vote or a preferential
vote for a candidate within a party.
Once the preliminary count is complete and the initial results are announced, the ballots
are locked up and sent to the “district municipality” in charge of the polling station. It is in
these district municipalities that the final and official counts of the votes are conducted. The
district election committee publicly counts each vote in order to ensure the transparency of
the election. First, the election committee counts each vote in the same manner as was done
in the preliminary count where only the total number of votes for the party is being found.
Once the votes for each party are counted, the election committee then separates the party
votes from the preferential votes and recounts them, in order to determine how many votes
each candidate received.
After the counting is finished, the results are recorded and sent to both the Ministry of
the Interior a Copenhagen-based governmental organization known as Statistics Denmark.
Statistics Denmark is responsible for creating and recording statistics regarding Danish so-
ciety, including demographics and election results. It is at Statistics Denmark that the seats
are allocated to each party and their respective candidates according to the method discussed
in Section 2.3.2. If the results are not contested, a digital record of the election is created,
and the original ballots are destroyed. Following the destruction of the ballots, the election
process is complete.
2.4 Methods of Voting
Due to the transparency throughout the Danish electoral process, voters and government
officials are reluctant to move towards different methods of voting (Evans & Paul, 2004).
There are, however, many different voting systems used throughout the world that allow the
visually impaired to vote in private that may be suitable for use in Denmark. Paper ballots
are among the most common form of voting worldwide, and can easily be modified to be
more accessible to the visually impaired. Mechanical systems are another common voting
scheme that may offer increased privacy to the visually impaired. Electronic voting machines
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are widely used in around the world as a blind-accessible alternative to traditional voting
methods, such as paper ballots. Finally, there are various forms of remote voting that allow
a visually impaired voter to cast their ballot from the privacy of their own home. While
we will examine these voting methods in detail the Results section of this report. However,
below, we provide a brief description of each voting system.
2.4.1 Paper Ballots
Paper ballots are among the oldest and simplest methods of voting. The most popular paper
ballot system in use throughout the world is the Australian Ballot, involving an official,
government distributed ballot that has a list of the candidates or parties involved in the
election. The voter need only mark the ballot with a pen or pencil, and place the ballot in
a secure box for future tabulation by election officials.
Braille Ballots
Braille ballots are a modification of paper voting systems that are accessible to the visually
impaired. In some cases, the modification is achieved by printing a braille version of the
normal paper ballot. However, a more common modification is to create a braille “template”
that can be placed over a standard ballot. This template has holes in it corresponding to
the locations where the voter is to mark the ballot. The voter lines up the template with
the ballot by using position markers on both the ballot and the template, and is able to read
the vote.
2.4.2 Mechanical Systems
Although mechanical voting systems are widely regarded as an antiquated method of voting,
they are still in use in many areas of the world. A mechanical voting system consists of
a console displaying many levers, a mechanism by which the votes may be tallied, and a
private booth so that the voter may cast their vote in private. In order to use this system,
a voter must enter the booth and turn the levers that correspond with their vote and then




While mechanical voting systems have seen a sharp decline in usage in recent years, electronic
voting machines have experienced significant growth (USFEC, 2000). Electronic voting ma-
chines have become especially prominent throughout the United States, with nearly 32.6% of
American voters using an electronic voting machine in 2008 (Moran, 2008). This represents
an increase of more than 400% over the data from 14 years ago (USFEC, 2000). Further-
more, electronic voting machines are widely considered to be highly accessible to the visually
impaired. With the passage of the Help America Vote Act, many districts within the United
States have adopted electronic voting machines in order to meet the requirement that each
voting precinct have at least one handicap accessible voting machine available. Of the many
different brands of electronic voting machines, there are two distinct types, Direct Recording
Electronic (DRE), and ballot marking systems.
Direct Recording Electronic Systems
DRE systems are the most common type of electronic voting system available. The voter
operates the machine by navigating the ballot through a computer screen, often with touch
screen capabilities. For the visually impaired, DRE systems will often include a hardware
keypad to navigate the ballot and an audio system that reads the ballot through a headset.
The important feature of DRE machines is that the entire process is digital, there is no paper
ballot involved. Votes are stored directly onto a hard drive or other storage medium and
electronically counted following the conclusion of Election Day. Thus, DREs allow election
results to be calculated with speed and accuracy far superior to any previous method of
counting.
Ballot Markers
Ballot markers are almost identical to DRE systems in terms of operation and accessibility
features. The main difference is only apparent when the voter actually casts their ballot. The
main difference is only apparent when the voter actually casts their ballot. Instead of storing
the vote electronically, ballot marking systems produce a completed paper ballot. In some
cases the system prints out a completed ballot after the vote has been cast. Alternatively the
voter could place an uncompleted ballot into the ballot marker device and select his or her
vote, at which point a mechanism within the ballot marker will place a mark in the desired
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field. The main benefit of ballot marking systems is that they offer the usability of a DRE
system, while still producing an auditable paper trail in case a recount must be conducted.
2.4.4 Remote Voting
Remote voting is the process of voting or casting one’s ballot from a location other than
the polling station. There are numerous methods of remote voting, the most common being
a postal ballot. Telephonic voting has also been used in recent years to allow the visually
impaired to vote in private. Finally, with recent advances in technology, some countries have
found it more feasible to use the internet as an online polling station.
Postal Voting
The oldest and most common method of remote voting comes in the form of mail-in ballots
(Karp & Banducci, 2000). If a person so chooses, they may receive a ballot through the
mail that they can then fill out in their own home. While postal ballots were traditionally
used only for those who had a legitimate reason for not being present at the voting booth,
postal ballots have since been made available to the general populace ((Qvortrup, 2005).
Proponents of mail-in voting state that postal voting is able to increase voter turnout while
significantly reducing costs. Implementing a postal ballot for the visually impaired, however,
would still require that an individual, likely a trusted friend or family member, be present
to assist the blind voter in completing the ballot.
Telephone Voting
Voting via telephone is a relatively new method of voting being implemented in some coun-
tries to help improve voter privacy for the visually impaired. There are multiple methods
by which a visually impaired voter may vote by telephone, each of which will be presented
and critiqued in detail in the Results section of this report. While telephone based voting
involves telling one’s vote to an election official, steps are taken to ensure that the identity of
the voter is unknown to the election official recording the votes. It is interesting to note that
a telephone based system would, in effect, be identical to the current method of voting for
visually impaired, wherein they tell their vote to one or more election officials. The critical
difference would be that the voter’s identity would remain anonymous.
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Internet Voting
Internet voting is one of the most recent developments in the field of voting technologies and
is not yet widely used throughout the world. A typical Internet voting system consists of a
personal computer, some type of identification key, and the software and hardware required
to securely and accurately record the votes. In order to cast a ballot the voter must log
onto a voting website using their identification key and complete an online ballot. After the
ballot is submitted a system of computers securely decrypts and tallies the votes.
2.5 Stakeholders
In order to truly analyze any of the voting systems discussed above, it is imperative that all
of the parties involved in the issue are identified and evaluated. These parties, also known as
stakeholders, have a vested interest in the outcome of our project. We must therefore tailor
our project to suit their needs and desires. The sponsoring party and a key stakeholder of
this project is the Danish Association of the Blind, a non-profit organization dedicated to
improving the quality of life for the visually impaired in Denmark. Visually impaired voters
are another group of stakeholders, for the obvious reason that the focus of this project is to
provide them with a means of accessible voting. Along with the visually impaired voters,
we must also take into account the desires of non-visually impaired voters. Because sighted
voters make up nearly all of the population, no voting system can be implemented without
their support. As it is the duty of the Danish government to oversee how elections are
conducted, they must consider any voting system we recommend to be acceptable if it is to
be implemented in Denmark. A brief description of each stakeholder can be found below,
while a more detailed analysis can be found in the Results section of this report.
The Danish Association of the Blind
Comprising of approximately 11000 members, the Danish Association of the Blind (DAB)
is the leading proponent for the rights of the visually impaired in Denmark (DAB, 2011),
and the sponsor behind this project. The primary concern of the Danish Association of the
Blind is improving the quality of life of visually impaired persons in Denmark. Some of
the key objectives of the organization are the creation of a fully accessible community, the
support of the visually impaired in living productive healthy lives, and the integration of the
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visually impaired into all facets of society. The Danish Association of the Blind holds stake in
this project because installing a system of voting that is accessible for the visually impaired
would satisfy all their objectives by providing the visually impaired with Independence and
privacy.
Visually Impaired Voters
Visually impaired persons (those with less than 33% normal vision) make up an estimated
1% (50,000 people) of the overall Danish population (Heilbrunn, 2011). According to John
Heilbrunn, Vice President of the Danish Association of the Blind, the visually impaired are
unhappy with the current system of voting in Denmark. As explained earlier in this report,
the issue of visually impaired voter privacy has not been viewed as a severe problem until
recently, when Denmark enacted new laws that require voting officials to enter voting booths
with visually impaired voters in order to aid them in casting their votes (MISA, 2009). This
project is very important for the visually impaired because, if successful, it could play a role
in providing them with a means of accessible voting.
Non-blind Danish Voters
While the visually impaired are a key stakeholder, it is important to note that they make
up less than 1% of the entire voting population. The other 99% of voters are sighted voters,
most of whom feel very comfortable using the current voting system. Therefore, in order for
a new system of voting to be accepted by the unimpaired voters of Denmark, it must gain
their trust by meeting high standards. An estimated 85% of eligible population of Denmark
will turnout for any given parliamentary election (IIDEA, 2001). Thus, Danish voters are
very serious about their electoral system and it is very important that they feel comfortable
when using the system and feel confident that their votes are correctly recorded. Any voting
system that cannot win over the sighted voter population is doomed to fail. Non-blind
Danish voters want to see a fair system of voting made available to all, but not at the cost
of jeopardizing the security of the electoral system.
The Danish Government
The government’s primary concern when it comes to voting is to ensure that the electoral
process is carried out in a manner that is seen as legitimate and fair by all parties involved,
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including an assurance that the process of voting follows a non-biased, private, and secure
system that is capable of providing trusted results. As noted by the Ministry of the Interior,
the government has been very hesitant to employ any modern voting technologies due to
common stigmas and a general mistrust in electronic voting systems ((MISA, 2009). Ad-
ditionally, the government has mandated that an election official be present in the voting
booth when a visually impaired person wishes to vote. The Danish government is a stake-
holder in this project because the recommended voting system could allow them to provide
an accessible system of voting to a neglected minority, and still be able to provide a secure
system of voting for the entire population.
2.6 Voting in Organizations
Although elections by secret ballot are on occasion necessary, they are not as common in
organizations and corporations. One can, however, envision situations in which a member’s
vote must be private. For example, when electing a new President or corporate CEO,
private elections are almost always a necessity. Such elections are problematic when visually
impaired members of the organization participate in voting if proper measures are not taken
to ensure they can vote in private.
Fortunately, there are multiple voting systems that allow the visually impaired to pri-
vately vote in an organizational or corporate setting. For simple yes-no votes, marking
or leaving blank an index card to vote is a trivial task for both sighted and visually im-
paired voters. For more complicated elections, a special booklet, known as a braille book,
is used. Finally, for elections when there are many voters present, electronic devices known
as audience responses systems can make the process of voting simple, straightforward, and
accessible for everyone involved. We will discuss these methods of voting in greater detail
in the Results and Analysis section of this report, and explain when it is appropriate to use
each voting system in our Recommendations section.
2.7 Summary of Background Research
In summation, the issues that this project seeks to rectify were made apparent by a recent
act of the Danish parliament, which mandates that visually impaired voters can only cast
their vote by telling an election official their vote. This act denies the visually impaired their
23
right to a secret ballot and violates several human rights resolutions made by the European
and international communities. However, visually impaired voting in Denmark has never
been totally private because a visually impaired voter cannot fill out the paper ballot that
has been used as Denmark’s sole form of voting since it became a democracy. Fortunately,
there have been alternative voting systems developed over the years that have allowed the
visually impaired voters in other countries to vote independently. In order for one of these
systems of voting to be implemented it must measure up to the standards of is stakeholders:




The purpose of this project was to recommend to the Danish Association of the Blind a
method of voting that allows visually impaired persons in Denmark to vote in state and
organizational elections with the same privacy afforded to all citizens. For state elections,
we also were seeking to recommend a course of action for the Danish Association of the
Blind to follow to help implement the recommended voting system throughout Denmark.
Finally, to help improve the privacy of visually impaired voters within Danish organizations
and corporations, we developed a list of best practices for conducting visually impaired
accessible elections.
As can be seen in Figure 3, there were three main phases in this project. The first
phase involved preliminary analysis regarding visually impaired voting. Much of this re-
Figure 3: Methodology Flowchart
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search and analysis was conducted during the preparation for the project, and can be seen
in the “Stakeholders” and “Comparisons between Voting Systems” sections of our report.
The second phase of work consisted of a more detailed analysis of the information we had
acquired. The second phase was conducted once we arrived in Denmark and were able to
hold discussions with our stakeholders. In the final phase of the project, we compiled and
presented our findings to the Danish Association of the Blind in the form of this report.
In order to assist us in completing the project, we created the chart seen in Figure 3,
detailing our approach to solving the problem presented by the Danish Association of the
Blind.
Furthermore, we created a series of project objectives that helped us to accomplish our
stated project goal. These objectives, which can also be seen in their respective phases in
Figure 3, are as follows:
• Research existing voting systems used by other countries to help visually impaired
voters vote in private.
• Conduct a stakeholder analysis.
• Compare and critique the existing voting systems with respect to the desires of our
stakeholders.
As we only had a limited amount of time to complete the project, we created a timeline
to assist us in time management, seen in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Timeline of Expected Completion of Objectives
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3.1 Research existing voting systems
The first goal of this project involved researching existing voting systems that allow the
visually impaired to vote in private. Information on the visually impaired accessible voting
systems was gathered through extensive background research. This background research
served two main purposes.
First, the information provided us with a better understanding of how each system oper-
ates. In order to make an accurate assessment of the benefits and drawbacks to using each
system, especially with regards to visually impaired voters, it was important that we learn
how each voting system functions. We also investigated the merits of each voting system
that make it an attractive method of voting in Denmark. Likewise, this research allowed
us to recognize and understand the different qualities of each voting system that visually
impaired voters or the Danish government may find unappealing. The background research
on the qualities of the different voting systems proved to be vital when determining which
system to recommend to the Danish Association of the Blind.
Second, a history of how each of the voting systems have been used in other countries, in-
cluding their implementations, successes, and failures, was constructed to serve as a guideline
for choosing a system to recommend, as well as suggesting an action plan for its implemen-
tation. We looked not only at the outcome of the utilization of each method of voting, but
also at why that outcome occurred. We determined if there were any major issues associated
with using each voting system and examined how these problems were addressed by other
countries. By understanding if and why the different voting schemes did or did not work,
we were able to properly compare the different methods of voting.
3.2 Conduct a stakeholder analysis
The second goal of this project was to determine what qualities our stakeholders wished to see
in a voting system. In order to accomplish this goal we conducted a thorough stakeholder
analysis in order to determine what qualities of voting systems were important to each
stakeholder and to gather information about any experiences and opinions the stakeholder
had regarding each voting system. In some cases, such as with the Danish Government,
significant background research was able to show what properties of a voting system a given
stakeholder was most interested in. Other stakeholders, such as visually impaired voters,
27
required more direct contact in the form of interviews. We will present the methods we used
to gather information on each of our stakeholders in the following subsections.
3.2.1 Visually Impaired Danish Voters
As the primary stakeholders in this project are visually impaired voters in Denmark, it was
necessary to analyze their opinions regarding voting prior to any significant analysis of voting
systems. In particular, we covered three important topics that allowed us to identify which
voting solution would best accommodate the desires of visually impaired voters. These topics
were:
1. Satisfaction with the current and previous methods of voting in Denmark.
2. Opinions regarding alternative voting systems.
3. Voting and elections within organizations.
In order to cover these topics, we conducted a series of one-on-one interviews with visually
impaired voters. Through the interviews, we were able to discuss the desires, experiences,
and views that blind voters in Denmark have regarding voting. By interviewing each subject
individually, rather than as a whole group or through a mass survey, we were able to better
understand into any concerns or opinions that the subject had with the different voting
methods or the Danish electoral process.
As the Danish Association of the Blind has a large membership composed of visually
impaired individuals, we requested their assistance in finding subjects for the interviews.
We created an interview request, seen in Appendix A, that was sent to all members of the
Danish Association of the Blind. Although the initial response was lower than expected,
a second series of emails prompted a much larger response rate. In total, we were able
to conduct seven interviews with members of the Danish Association of the Blind. These
subjects were selected to represent visually impaired voters of different ages, professions, and
levels of visual impairment, in order to best represent the visually impaired community in
Denmark. Of these interviews three were conducted in person, and four were conducted by
phone.
In order to prepare for each interview, we created an interview plan that we used to guide
us through the interview process. While a general interview plan for a visually impaired voter
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can be seen in Appendix B, each plan was tailored to the individual we were interviewing.
Furthermore, we conducted what background research we could on the subjects in order to
make the interview specific to the subject being interviewed. This included information on
the subject’s relationship with the Danish Association of the Blind, their current profession,
and level of visual impairment.
During each interview, one person was designated as the interviewer, and another as
the note taker. The interviewer read the verbal consent form, seen in Appendix C, to
each of the subjects before the interview began. While the note taker did write down the
subjects responses to the questions asked, no interviews were ever recorded. Each interview
lasted approximately 30-60 minutes. After each interview, summaries of the responses were
compiled from the interview notes. Following the completion of the Phase 1 interviews, the
general responses were summarized and analyzed. The resulting information gathered during
these interviews was used in the creation of the Results and Analysis section of this report.
3.2.2 Non-blind Danish Voters
It is possible that the voting system that we recommend to the Danish Association of the
Blind will be used by everyone, not only the visually impaired. Therefore, we had to de-
termine which voting systems are acceptable to both visually impaired and sighted voters.
In order to investigate what qualities a voting system would need in order to be accepted
by non-blind Danish voters, we conducted significant research into the opinions of sighted
Danish Voters through surveys.
We conducted a large survey of sighted voters on their opinion of electronic voting sys-
tems. We felt it important to exclusively discuss electronic voting systems in these surveys
for two reasons. First, as these surveys were meant to take no longer than five minutes, we
were limited in the number of questions that we could ask. Secondly, though electronic vot-
ing systems are among the most accessible in the world, there is a great deal of controversy
surrounding their use. We conducted these surveys in order to better gauge the public’s
reaction towards a switch to an electronic voting system. We conducted these surveys by
travelling to the center of Copenhagen and asking people on the street if they would like to
participate in an anonymous survey. If they accepted, we then asked them two questions:
1. Would you trust an electronic system to be used in governmental elections? Why or
why not?
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2. Would you trust an electronic system to be used in governmental elections if it printed
out a completed paper ballot, rather than storing the votes electronically? Why or
why not?
Though the identities of the responders remained anonymous, we have compiled the
demographics and results of the surveys, and placed them in the Analysis section of the
report.
3.2.3 The Danish Government
If any method of voting is to be adopted in Denmark, it must first be approved by the Danish
government. Therefore, it was important that we recommend to the Danish Association of
the Blind a method of voting that not only provides the visually impaired with the ability
to vote in private, but one that would also be deemed acceptable for use by the Danish
government. We went about determining what criteria a voting system must fulfill to be
approved by the Danish government through two methods.
First, we conducted significant background research into the views of the Danish govern-
ment towards the different accessible voting systems used in foreign elections. A great deal
of this background research originated from official statements released by the Ministry of
the Interior and the Ministry of Social Affairs regarding the electoral process in Denmark. In
these statements, both Ministries note their stances on the usage of certain voting schemes,
such as electronic voting, and explain why they hold that stance. These statements were
used as the basis for our stakeholder analysis, as they detail specifically what their issues
are with such voting systems. By analyzing the concerns outlined in these statements, we
were able determine how the different voting schemes needed to be modified if they were to
be considered acceptable for use by the Danish government.
The second method we used to conduct a stakeholder analysis on the Danish government
was through discussions with the members of the Danish government. While the official
documents proved useful in our analysis, they left out many important options for accessible
voting systems. Thus, we decided that by contacting members of the Danish government,
we could better determine which voting systems could be implemented in Denmark. The
members of the government that we contacted included the members of the Danish parlia-
ment, the Ministry of the Interior, and municipal elections boards. We hoped that we could
present our findings thus far, and determine if any of the researched systems adequately met
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the criteria put forth by the Danish government. If none of the systems were acceptable, we
would be able to directly ask what would need to be done to make them acceptable, and use
that feedback to better find or craft a voting scheme that would meet the desires of both
the Danish government, and visually impaired voters.
Once the background research and interviews were completed the information that was
gathered was used to compile an analysis of the opinions of the Danish Government in regards
to accessible voting for the visually impaired. This analysis was then used to help us make
our final recommendation. The analysis can be found in the Results and Analysis section of
this report.
3.3 Compare and critique existing solutions with respect to the
desires of our stakeholders
After background research and a preliminary stakeholder analysis had been conducted, we
moved on to the second phase of our project involving a more in depth analysis of the
different methods of voting. Because each voting system had at least some qualities that
made it preferable to other methods of voting, we could not analyze each voting system
in a vacuum. Therefore, the primary component of this in depth analysis was conducted
by comparing and critiquing the attributes of the voting systems against each other. We
assessed the different methods of voting in two main ways.
First, we qualitatively compared the attributes of each voting system with the desires
of our stakeholders. For instance, though electronic systems are expensive, they do offer
significant usability advantages when compared to other methods of voting. Therefore, we
determined exactly what criteria we felt was most important, and from that, determined
which methods of voting would appeal to the broadest number of stakeholders.
Second, just as important as knowing why a voting system worked, is understanding the
political and social process that led to its adoption. We found that no system is perfect,
and that all systems had hurdles that needed to be overcome before they were adopted. We
determined how these challenges were met so we could propose not only a system, but also a
method of implementation that fits Denmark’s needs. Therefore, we had to know how other
countries were able to overcome the challenges inherent to each system. We also researched
the causes behind the implementation of accessible voting systems around the world. An
understanding of the political climate of a country that adopted a voting system that is
31
usable by the visually impaired was necessary to understand why one system was adopted
over another.
3.4 Summary of Methods
The goal of this project was to recommend to the Danish Association of the Blind a method
of voting that would allow the visually impaired to privately vote in state and organizational
elections. We accomplished this goal by setting forth three objectives. First, by conducting
a thorough stakeholder analysis, we were able to determine what criteria a voting system
must meet in order for it to be successfully implemented in Denmark. Second, we researched
different methods of voting used around the world. Through this research, we were able
to see the different benefits and challenges associated with each voting system. Finally,
we compared and critiqued the different voting schemes with respect to the desires of our
stakeholders. Through these three objectives, we were able to successfully determine which
method of voting should be implemented in Denmark, as well as recommend a course of
action for the Danish Association of the Blind to follow.
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4 Results and Analysis
In this section, we discuss our results from addressing the three objectives of this project. As
discussed in the Methodology section of this report, our objectives consisted of background
research into existing voting systems, conducting an extensive stakeholder analysis, and,
finally, comparing and critiquing the voting systems with respect to our stakeholders’ desires.
4.1 Research of Existing Voting Systems
Through our research, we studied and analyzed the many different methods of voting used
around the world, ranging from simple paper ballots to high-tech electronic machines. Though
we found that some voting systems, such as mechanical ballots and traditional paper ballots,
are completely inaccessible to the visually impaired, many of the voting systems researched
have measures in place that allow blind voters to vote in private. In this section, we will
discuss and analyze our findings on the different voting systems.
4.1.1 Paper Ballots
The most time tested and consistently utilized method of voting is the paper ballot. One of
the main reasons that the paper ballot has been so successful is that people trust it more
than any other method of voting (Randell, 2006). There are several reasons for this strong
sense of trust in paper systems. One reason is the fact that the paper ballot has been around
since the time of the Roman Empire and people have an instinctive trust in systems that
have been in place for such a long time (Randell, 2006).
Another factor that contributes to paper ballot being the most trusted system is the fact
that a paper ballot is a physical record of a vote that can be counted by hand. Therefore
in order to cast a vote one must physically insert a ballot into a ballot box. These ballot
boxes are very easy to keep watch over, which means election officials can prevent election
fraud with relative ease. Also since the ballots are locked in the ballot box it is very easy to
inspect and review the votes in case there have been any concerns about the legitimacy of
the vote (Randell, 2006).
Yet another reason for the high levels of trust that voters have for the paper ballot system
is the simplicity of the system. There are no moving parts and therefore there is no room
for mechanical error, only human error, and people are more likely to trust a person than a
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machine (Randell, 2006). In addition there seems to be very little instance of user related
errors from any age group. These factors contribute to a very low overall error rate of just
1.5% (Byrne, 2007). This low error rate shows that paper ballots are a very reliable and
trusted way of voting.
Although most people have no trouble when completing a simple paper ballot, there are
many people with disabilities that make it impossible or very difficult to vote on a plain
paper ballot. People who are visually impaired or even illiterate for that matter have no
means by which to vote independently and secretly in an election that is solely paper based
(Byrne, 2007). Therefore, in order to vote on paper ballots, a visually impaired voter must
have another person fill out their vote for them.
Braille Ballots
The Braille ballot is currently a common alternative for making paper ballots accessible to
the visually impaired. Braille ballots are a very easily implementable method of accessible
voting because they simply modify a system already in place. But, while it may seem like an
obvious solution to the challenge of allowing the visually impaired to vote in private, there
are many problems associated with Braille ballots.
Figure 5: Sample Braille Ballot Template (Source: http://www.memco.net/ballot.htm)
Printed Braille ballots are much more expensive than their traditional paper counterparts,
costing about ten times more than regular ballots (Jacobsen, 2008). For this reason Braille
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templates are more commonly used than printed Braille ballots, because only one Braille
template needs to be printed off per polling station. A Braille template, seen in Figure 5, is
essentially a copy of the regular ballot with holes cut in it that match up with the fields on a
regular ballot where a voter is supposed to mark their vote. In order to vote the voter places
the template over the regular ballot and indicates their vote by marking the regular ballot
through the chosen hole in the template. While it may not be obvious from the picture, the
black circles located next to the candidate’s names in Figure 5 are the holes where the mark
is to be places.
A major challenge associated with using Braille ballots is the fact that so few visually
impaired people are Braille literate. A study carried out by National Federation for the
Blind reports that, “Fewer than 10 percent of the 1.3 million legally blind people in the
United States read Braille” (Asociated Press, 2009)). Braille illiteracy is also becoming
very prevalent in other countries especially in Europe (Christensen, 2000). There are several
reasons for this decrease in literacy. One large factor is that more and more visually impaired
people are opting to use speech synthesis software in place of Braille. Less and less people are
bothering with Braille, because it is difficult to learn, and Braille devices are usually more
expensive than the speech synthesis alternative (Christensen, 2000). Furthermore, reading
via Braille is very time consuming. Many Braille readers can only get through 50 words or
less in a minute’s time (Asociated Press, 2009). Another contributing factor to the loss of
Braille literacy is the reluctance of the late or elderly blind to put in the effort required to
learn Braille (Christensen, 2000).
Yet another problem braille ballots is that Braille print takes up much more space on
a piece of paper than print does. For example, “a one-page ballot paper translates into 11
pages of braille” (Jacobsen, 2008). This proves to be an issue when applied to the already
complex and cumbersome Danish paper ballot.
4.1.2 Mechanical Systems
One type of voting system that has been widely used in the past are Mechanical Lever Voting
Machines. The lever machine was invented in 1892, and by the 1960s it was the most used
voting system in the US, but by 2000 only about 18 percent of voters used the machines
(Evans & Paul, 2004). In order to use the lever machines a voter enters a private booth and
turns a series of levers that signify their choices for the election. If a voter wishes to change
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their vote for any reason all they have to do is turn the lever back on the unwanted choice
and pull the lever on the new choice. After the voter is satisfied with their choices, they pull
a large master lever, and the vote is mechanically tallied. When the voter exits the booth
the action of the door or curtain opening resets all the levers (Novick, 2009).
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Examples of Lever Machines ( http://www.bradblog.com/?p=6956 and
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Voting machine.png)
Although today the lever machines, seen in Figure 6, are viewed as obsolete and outdated
in many areas of the US, there are still some places, such as the state of New York that
prefer these machines due to the unique advantages they possess over other systems (Novick,
2009). One distinct advantage of mechanical voting machines is that it is difficult for anyone
to rig or tamper with the machines. Since there are only mechanical components these
machines cannot be hacked like their electronic counterparts (Novick, 2009). In addition
these machines emit a loud “thunk” sound when the master lever is pulled which contributes
to voter satisfaction that their vote has been cast (Evans & Paul, 2004). This voting system
is also able to completely eliminate the issue of over-voting by mechanically disabling the
voter from casting an over-vote (Schwartz, 2002).
However there are several striking disadvantages with the use of mechanical voting sys-
tems. First, the lever machines do not create any physical record of each voter’s ballot. When
the master lever is pulled the votes are simply tallied on a gauge (Schwartz, 2002). This
eliminates the possibility of a recount if fraud is suspected and prevents a voter from being
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sure if the vote they cast was recorded correctly (Evans & Paul, 2004). Second, mechanical
voting machines have also been known to be inaccurate and unreliable due to mechanical
error. For instance, when the mechanical counting device turns over from 999 to 1000 much
more force is needed to turn the multiple wheels. In some instances, this results in the wheels
failing to turn completely, and thus failing to record a vote (Evans & Paul, 2004). Third,
there is also wide spread voter dissatisfaction with the mechanical voting system. A study
performed by Rice University indicates that in comparison with electronic and paper voting
systems, the fewest participants preferred the mechanical lever system (Kristen K. Greene
& Everett, 2006).
Unfortunately the mechanical lever voting system does not seem to be a viable option
for solving the issue of providing a secret ballot for the visually impaired. The visually
impaired would, for example, have no way of knowing which levers should be pulled for
which candidates and would need to be accompanied into the voting booth by an aide who
casts their vote for them (Evans & Paul, 2004). Although the location of certain levers and
their function may be described to visually impaired voters audibly or by Braille writing on
the machines, this can be extremely frustrating and confusing when the number of choices
on the machine is very large (Gallagher, 2009).
4.1.3 Electronic Systems
Though not as common as paper ballots, electronic voting machines have become one of
the most widely used alternative methods of voting around the world. Electronic voting
machines have become especially prevalent in the United States, where they are being used
to replace aging mechanical systems. A map of states that use electronic voting systems can
be seen in Figure 7. While it may seem as though electronic voting systems make up a small
portion of the total votes cast, the number of voters using electronic machines is growing.
Five times as many voters used electronic voting machines in the 2008 elections than in the
2000 elections.
While there are many different electronic voting machines, they all fall into one of two
categories. The first and most common type of electronic voting machine are Direct Record-
ing Electronic, or DRE, machines. DRE voting systems stores votes directly to a hard drive
or other storage medium. The second type of electronic voting machine is known as a ballot
marker. Ballot markers are almost exactly the same as DRE machines, except they produce
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Figure 7: Map of Voting Systems Used by States (http://dvice.com/voting/map2.php)
a paper ballot, rather than storing the vote electronically.
DRE Machines
DRE machines are by far the most common form of electronic voting used worldwide. Rather
than create a physical ballot, DRE machines are entirely digital; no paper ballot is produced.
As a result, election results can be tabulated immediately following the closing of the polling
station. Furthermore, because there is no paper ballot, DRE machines, if implemented
correctly, can greatly reduce the chance of voter error. Spoiled ballots caused by voting for
too many or too few candidates, or incorrectly marking a paper ballot, can result in many
votes being declared invalid. In the 2000 US election alone, approximately two million ballots
were spoiled due to voter error, accounting for 1.8% of the national vote (The Center for
Election Science, 2011). Two million votes can easily be the difference between one candidate
and another. DRE machines can eliminate accidental under votes or over votes by notifying
the voter when there is an error with their ballot.
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This ability to detect errors in the ballot is one of the reasons why electronic systems
are often considered by voters to be much easy to use. Cathy Cox, former Georgia Secre-
tary of State describes the opinions of voters using electronic systems stating that “97% of
respondents reported that they had no difficulties” when using the electronic systems (Cox,
2003). Indeed, a study conducted at Rice University found that voters were “significantly
more satisfied with their experience on voting” on electronic machines when compared to
other voting methods (Everett, 2007). This is increase in usability comes from the greater
versatility of electronic systems. Rather than have to fit every party and candidate on a
single page, electronic voting machines allow for more intuitive methods of navigating the
ballot.
The increase in usability is not limited to sighted voters. Electronic voting machines are
among the most accessible method of voting to the visually impaired. For example, electronic
voting systems often have ballot magnification features that allow those with partial sight
to better read the ballot (VisionAware, 2010). For completely blind voters, most electronic
Figure 8: Diebold Accuvote System
(http://pcworld.about.com/magazine/2206p121id115608.htm)
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voting machines use audio cues to help the voter navigate ballots (Sanchez-Palacios, 2000).
By speaking the names on the ballots through a pair of headphones, DRE systems such as
the iVotronic Audio Ballot allow blind persons to vote independently in complete privacy
(Waterstone, 2003). A numerical keypad is often used for these systems so that the voter
can scroll through the list of names without difficulty (VisionAware, 2010). Such is the case
with the Diebold Accuvote system seen in Figure 8.
Auditory voting systems have been used successfully in Washington DC, allowing individ-
uals with visual impairments to vote privately since 2004 (PR Newswire, 2004). According
to Jim Dickson, the vice president of the American Association of People with Disabilities,
the organization that lobbied for the electronic voting machines in Washington DC, the re-
sponse among blind voters has been overwhelmingly positive, stating that the inclusion of
these systems is a “huge step for democracy.”
DRE voting systems, however, are not without their faults. Many critics of DRE sys-
tems cite security and privacy concerns associated with DRE machines as unacceptable and
“damaging to the credibility of the electoral process (Blanc, 2007).” As with all machines,
DREs are vulnerable to tampering, both in hardware and software, in many cases without
the end user knowing what is occurring (Hursti, 2006). Even after all votes are cast, it is
possible for an attacker to modify the voting records to be in favor of one candidate over
another (Ariel J. Feldman, 2006). Additionally, as many DREs use smart cards that store
voter registration lists, a hacker could access this list to identify what candidates voters
chose, negating any privacy offered by the machine (Arthur M. Keller, 2004).
The concerns over the security of DRE machines are only heightened by the lack of a
paper trail, making it difficult, if not impossible, to conduct a recount if election fraud is
committed (Moynihan, 2004a). This absence of a physical ballot to ensure that one’s vote has
been counted correctly has led to a distrust of electronic systems in many societies, including
Denmark (Heilbrunn, 2011). Germany, for instance, declared DRE systems unconstitutional
in 2009 because the absence of a paper ballot in such systems makes tampering difficult to
detect (Federal Constitutional Court Press office, 2009). Similarly, the Netherlands returned
to using paper ballots after using electronic voting machines for over a decade, citing the
lack of any paper receipt as the systems “biggest shortcoming(Libbenga, 2007).”
While migrating to DREs can save money in the long term due to decreased administra-
tive costs, the short term costs associated with DRE systems may be prohibitive. According
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to the Verified Voting Foundation, the average cost of a DRE system can range between
$3500 and $4500. Bearing in mind that multiple machines would need to be purchased in
order to reduce backlog, the cost to change to DREs is not insignificant, especially when
one considers the fact that these machines may only be used once every 2-4 years. A report
published in December of 2005 noted the increased costs of DREs, stating that the electronic
systems can increase a voting districts annual election-related expenditures by up to 57.3%
when compared to paper ballots (Myerson, 2005).
Even though learning how to use a DRE machine is considered easy, learning a new
interface can still lead to confusion among voters. This confusion could lead to increased
wait times, as voters unfamiliar with using electronic voting machines spend more time
navigating and filling out their electronic ballot. While it is possible to prepare voters for
the new system by allowing them to try out the voting machine beforehand or through
information sessions, studies have shown that voters rarely take part in such sessions. When
New York City began adopting electronic machines in 2010, only 9000 of the 4 million
registered voters attended the information sessions and machine demonstrations that the
city provided (Kaminer, 2010).
Although the above concerns are reasonable, most can be easily addressed through policy
or technology solutions. For example, the security issues with electronic systems can be
addressed by isolating the electronic voting machines from the internet and limiting access
to input ports on the machines (Shamos, 2004). While the public is still likely to be wary
of privacy and security concerns inherent in electronic voting systems, these fears can be
addressed. In his master’s thesis, “Trust in E-Voting Systems”, Mikkel Sorenson describes
the four most important factors for gaining trust in electronic voting systems in Denmark.
The first of these comes from positive attention from the media. Danish individuals place a
great deal of trust in their local media, and the endorsement of local news organizations will
almost certainly result in an increased level of voter confidence in electronic systems. Second,
Sorenson states that giving the voter the ability to verify that their vote was correctly counted
by displaying a receipt of the vote will also result in an increased acceptance of electronic
systems. What is interesting is that these receipts need not be paper in nature, electronic
receipts appear to be a sufficient enough proof for a voter to place their trust in an electronic
machine (Sørensen, 2008).
One interesting measure that can be used to increase both security and voter trust in
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DREs is making the voting machine hardware and software open source. Rather than keep-
ing the hardware and software of the voting machine secret, as many DRE manufacturers
currently do, some companies have begun to release every detail of their voting machine,
including the source code, to the public. According to Matt Quinn, lead engineer on an open
source DRE known as eVACS stated that making the source code public guarantees that
developers do not have any “election subverting code” present within the system (Zetter,
2003). Quinn goes on to note that releasing the source code of eVACS has “deflected” much
of the criticism aimed at DRE machines and led to a very positive reaction among users.
Open source voting machines, such as eVACS, have been successful in Australia, where they
have been used since the early 2000s.
While detailing how the voting system operates may seem like it would decrease the
security of such a system, in reality, the opposite occurs. Opening the software up to public
inspection can result in flaws being discovered that would have otherwise remained in the
code. Open source operating systems have been using this methodology of bug checking
for years, leading to quick fixes when any security flaws are found. Indeed, Bruce Schneier,
one of the world’s foremost experts and cryptography and computer security, has stated that
computer security experts unanimously agree that “software used on DRE machines must be
open to public scrutiny (Schneier, 2004).” According to Schneier, open sourcing the voting
machine is one of the best methods of mitigating security concerns associated with DREs.
Ballot Markers
Though not as commonly used as DRE voting systems, ballot markers retain many of the
positive features associated with electronic voting machines, such as their accessibility and
ability to detect and correct voter errors, while eliminating many of the common criticisms.
The process of voting with a ballot marker is illustrated in Figure 9 on the next page. Though
the navigation of the ballot and the selections of candidates is the same as on DREs, ballot
markers are very different when it comes to casting the vote. Instead of storing the vote
digitally, as DREs do, ballot markers either print out a completed paper ballot, or fill in a
paper ballot that is inserted by the voter. By looking at the printed ballot, the voter is able
to confirm that their vote was correctly recorded.
The ability to verify that one’s vote was accurately cast has led many to trust ballot
markers over other electronic machines. Indeed, a report on the United States Voter Confi-
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Figure 9: Diagram of Paper-Verified Electronic Voting System
dence and Accessibility Act of 2007 stated that having an electronic machine print a paper
ballot “restores public confidence” in the voting machine (Brady, 2007). Voters feel more
certain that their vote will be properly recorded if they have a tangible ballot. The presence
of a paper ballot not only increases the perceptions of election security, but it actually results
in a more secure election.
The risk of election fraud is greatly reduced if printed ballot is used to cast ones vote,
rather than an electronically recorded tally. As Dan Wallach, an associate professor at Rice
University, notes, with ballot markers, the security and “correctness” of the voting system
software no longer an issue (Wallach, 2005). Wallach goes on to state that, if the voter
is able to read the printed ballot, then “either [the voting machine] consistently produces
paper ballots that match voters’ intent, or it is taken out of service.” Even if such a system
were to be hacked or tampered with, there is no way the hacker could modify the system to
influence the results of the election. A voter would be able to notice any differences in the
ballot and their intended vote before they cast the ballot.
Interestingly, the increased security from printing out a paper ballot means that fewer
precautions need to be taken to ensure the security of the voting machine. If a voting machine
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prints a ballot and erases the voter’s selections from memory, there is no need to develop and
implement a complex security algorithm that protects the voter’s choices from tampering.
Similarly, proprietary hardware designed to be tamper-proof is unnecessary. Instead, any
computer outfitted with a printer could sufficiently carry out all of the necessary functions
of a ballot marker. An example of this can be seen in Figure 10, showing an eVACS system
designed to be accessible by the visually impaired. The entire system is composed only of a
computer, a printer, a monitor, and a keypad. As a result, ballot markers can be significantly
less expensive that other electronic voting machines.
(a) (b)
Figure 10: eVACS Voting System (http://www.softimp.com.au)
Like all voting methods, however, ballot markers are not perfect. As with DRE machines,
voters must learn the ballot marker’s interface in order to use the voting machine. If the
ballot marker requires the voter to insert a ballot beforehand, the extra step may result in
even more confusion. According to the Association of Computing Machinery, any electronic
voting system will need to be “as simple as possible” if it is to be considered usable by the
public Harry Hocheiser (2005). With every step added to the voting procedure comes an
increased chance that the voter may become confused.
This complexity becomes an even greater problem if the voter is visually impaired. If the
ballot marker simply marks an existing paper ballot, rather than printing a brand new one,
the visually impaired voter must be able to insert the ballot into the ballot marker in the
correct orientation. Furthermore, as the ballot produced by ballot markers is still a paper
ballot, it is not verifiable by visually impaired voters. If a blind voter is to be sure that their
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ballot was correctly printed, a second system would need to be implemented that could read
the printed ballot to the voter. This is added component only increases the overall cost of
the voting system, while adding to the complexity of voting.
The increased complexity associated with ballot markers not only presents challenges to
the voter, but also adds to the complexity of the voting system, and the potential problems
posed by such complexities. The addition of a printer to the voting system greatly increases
the likelihood that such a system could breakdown. As former president of the League of
Women Voters of the United States Kay Maxwell stated before the US Election Commission,
“Printers are among the least reliable of computer system components. They jam, they need
paper, they are slow. . . (Maxwel, 2004)” Considering that that voting machines are expected
to be used all day, any malfunction can result in significant wait times. In one instance,
printer failures in Brazil resulted in voters waiting as long as 12 hours to be able to vote
(Shamos, 2004).
Many of these challenges, however, are of concern only if ballot markers are the only
available system to vote with. Fortunately, this is rarely the case. Indeed, implementing
ballot markers does not necessitate that everyone cast votes via a ballot marker. Rather, if
the ballot marker is made to produce a paper ballot that is identical to the standard ballot,
their use by voters can be optional. Those comfortable with manually filling out a paper
ballot can do so, while those who wish to use an electronic voting machine can use the ballot
marker.
Making the usage of ballot markers optional rather than mandatory also results in a
decreased cost of implementation, as fewer ballot marking machines need to be purchased.
Instead of completely refitting each polling center with electronic machines, only one or two
ballot markers would need to be purchased for each polling station. Furthermore, having a
few ballot markers at each polling station would still enable the visually impaired to vote in
private, while reducing the possibility of increased wait times caused by voters attempting
to learn a new interface. If the voter backlog becomes too great, voters may opt to manually
fill out their ballot. Similarly, if the voting machine breaks down, voters will not have to
wait until the machine is fixed. While having ballot markers complement the existing system
does not fix the problems associated with ballot markers, it does address those challenges in
a manner that limits their potential to disrupt the voting process.
It is important to note, though, that ballot marking devices should still be able to be used
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by anyone who wishes to vote through them, not just the visually impaired. If all voters
are able, but not required, to vote through ballot markers, sighted voters can indirectly
verify the machines accuracy for the visually impaired. While the visually impaired may
not be able to read their ballot, sighted voters who use the machine will be able to confirm
whether or not their vote was accurately printed. If a sighted voter notices that the ballot
marker is incorrectly marking their ballot, they will be able to alert election officials of
the malfunctioning machine. Similarly, as the voting machine has no way of determining
whether or not the voter is blind or sighted, if sighted voters consistently see that their ballot
is correctly printed, it is safe to assume that the machine is functioning properly for visually
impaired voters (Wallach, 2005).
4.1.4 Remote Voting
While electronic machines are useful in addressing many of the privacy issues disabled voters
face in the voting booth, some visually impaired voters may find it easier to vote in the
privacy of their own homes. Remote voting has been used for many decades in countries
around the world, though not always for the blind or visually impaired. Many countries use
postal ballots in order to allow voters, to vote in government elections if they cannot make
it to the polling station, due either to disability or geographic complexities. Advances in
technology have opened up new ways of voting from afar, be it by telephone or the internet.
These systems have allowed voters, especially those with visual impairments, to conveniently
vote in privacy.
Postal Voting
The oldest and most common method of remote voting comes in the form of mail-in ballots
(Karp & Banducci, 2000). If a person so chooses, they may receive a ballot through the mail
that they can then fill out in their own home. While they were traditionally used only for
those who had a legitimate reason for not being present at the voting booth, postal ballots
have since been opened for use to the general populace (Qvortrup, 2005). Proponents of
mail-in voting state that postal voting is able to increase voter turnout while significantly
reducing costs. According to Qvortrup, the state of Oregon was able to reduce the cost of
voting from US$4.33 per vote to US$1.33 per vote by switching to a postal voting system.
These reductions in costs are not isolated; New Zealand was able to save 3.6 million USD
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by using a mail-in ballot in one of their referendums (Karp & Banducci, 2000).
One country where postal ballots are used extensively is the United States, where they
are more commonly known as absentee ballots. While the original intent of absentee ballots
was to allow voters who could not make it to their designated polling station to vote, many
states now allow that anyone be granted a postal ballot. The use of mail-in ballots is so
widespread that nearly 26% of registered voters, approximately 32 million people, voted
using postal ballots in the 2008 presidential election (USFEC, 2000). In some states, such as
Washington, 88% of the votes cast are done so via mail. When studying the public opinions
of voting by mail, the Washington state election board noted the some important benefits to
remote voting in such a manner. First, many voters do not have the time to travel to their
polling station to vote. Mail-in ballots allow electors to vote on their own time. Second,
voters may not always know about every candidate on the ballot before voting. A postal
ballot allows voters to research each individual on the ballot before making their decision.
These factors, according to Washington’s States 2007 report, have led to Washington having
one of the highest voter turnout rates in the country (Office of the Secretary of State of
Washington, 2007).
For these reasons, voting by mail seems to be a viable solution if one wishes to allow
the blind to vote in the privacy of their own home. While a blind individual may need a
trusted person to fill out the ballot for them, many blind persons in Denmark found this
to be acceptable when voting in a polling booth (Heilbrunn, 2011). If the voter wishes to
have even more privacy, a braille ballot may be used. Furthermore, because the blind person
would be able to fill out the ballot whenever they wish, the increased size, and therefore
time devoted to the ballot, becomes less of an issue.
Even with these benefits, however, many countries in Europe are wary of allowing postal
voting in a non-supervised setting. Finland requires that votes be filled out at specified
polling stations, effectively negating many of the benefits gained from mailing in one’s vote.
The causes for this mistrust vary from the fear that one’s vote may not actually be counted,
to a detachment from the democratic process (Qvortrup, 2005). Additionally, while many
locales have had success in increasing voter turnout through postal votes, this certainly is
not always the case. Qvortrup notes that Britain’s attempts at using a mail-in ballot to
increase turnout was a failure. Furthermore, because Danish law requires that an election
official be present if a Danish citizen, even a perfectly sighted one, wishes to fill out a postal
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ballot from their own home (Grabenwarter, 2004), adoption of a mail-in ballot seems would
face significant challenges.
Telephone Voting
Voting via telephone is a relatively new method of voting being implemented around the
world to help improve voter privacy for the visually impaired. In a telephone-based voting
system implemented by the UK, each voter registered to televote receives a unique personal
identification (PIN) number via mail or a specified election office (Katsakis, 2005). The
voter can then call a specified call center at any time in the two weeks leading up to the
election, identify themselves with their PIN, and have their vote recorded by the call center.
According to the UK Electoral Commission, user feedback of the televote system has been
exceptional, with 93% of the voters rating the system as good or very good, 99% saying that
the system was convenient, and over 90% reporting that the privacy provided by the system
was adequate (Katsakis, 2005).
Similar to postal voting, one of the major benefits to using a telephone based voting
system is greater convenience for the voters. According to the UK Electoral Commissions,
99% of voters who used a televoting system stated that it was convenient for them (Kat-
sakis, 2005). Because voters can vote whenever they please, and are not required to travel
to a polling stations, voter turnout has improved in many of the districts where voting
by telephone has been implemented. In the town of Stewiacke in Canada, voter turnout
jumped from 35% to 71% after televoting technology became available in municipal elec-
tions (Comeau, 2010). Dean Smith, the president and founder of Intelivote, a company that
manufactures electronic and telephonic voting systems, states that the impetus behind this
rise in voter participation stems from the convenience of being able to vote whenever one
wishes. While we could find no study on Danish opinions of telephone based voting, positive
feedback from users of televoting systems across the world indicate that it might be readily
accepted by the Danish populace.
Furthermore, telephone-based voting systems are relatively low-cost when compared to
electronic voting machines. While a trial in outfitting 29 districts in Australia with elec-
tronic voting machines cost US$2.2 million, a telephonic voting system cost Australia only
US$375,000 (Hutchinson, 2010). This low cost can be seen elsewhere around the world; the
Intelivote system used in Canada cost only US$2 per vote (Comeau, 2010). While this is
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still greater than the cost of postal voting, it is much less than the traditional ballot, and
far cheaper than using a braille ballot.
Telephone voting systems are also considered to be both private and secure (Headd, 2005).
While it may seem counterproductive to have a voting system in which you must tell your
vote to another, telephonic voting systems often do not require that the person recording
the vote know the name of the elector, they only need a Pin or other form of verification
to ensure that the person voting is registered (AEC, 2010). Therefore, while the election
official on the other end of the line knows the voters choices, there is no way for them to
connect that information to a specific person, the voter is kept anonymous. In countries such
as Australia, this level of privacy has been deemed sufficient by blind persons (Hutchinson,
2010). Furthermore, speech recognition technologies have advanced to the point where it is
possible that a fully automated system can handle the entire process, from reading the ballot
to the voter, to understanding and recording who the voter wishes to elect (Headd, 2005).
For the purposes of auditing the election, the system could collect the audio recordings of the
person’s votes. This could alleviate fears that one’s vote may be tampered with, as election
officials would be able to review the audio recordings to make sure they were properly cast.
One of the major challenges that would need to be overcome if voting by telephone were
to become available in Denmark is the Danish stance on remote voting. As stated by the
Danish Ministry of the Interior, the Danish government believes that remote voting, and
especially remote electronic voting, is antithetical to one of the primary principles of Danish
electoral law, that an official is present to ensure not only that the person voting is who
they say they are, but that their vote is conducted in private. While voting by telephone
provides a somewhat greater assurance that one’s votes are not tampered with, compared
with electronic systems, due to the ability to audit one’s votes and the presence of an election
official on the other end of the phone, it could be difficult to verify that the person voting
is who they say they are. If someone was to acquire a voter’s PIN, and that was they only
form of identification necessary, they would be able to cast a vote as someone else. The
Ministry of the Interior has also stated that a paper ballot is necessary for any voting system
to appropriately integrate into the Danish electoral process. In the case of a telephone based
voting method, the introduction of a paper ballot may be complicated.
There are also questions raised on the stability of telephone based systems. Electronic and
Telephone based systems suffered blackouts in the 2010 municipal elections for many towns
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across Ontario (Schnurr, 2010). According to Joanne Schnurr, reporting for the Canadian
news network CTV, “hundreds of voters” were unable to vote due to the system crashing.
While it is important to note this was both a web and telephone based system, and that
the crashing was due to the unexpected volume of votes cast, the issue of system instability
needs to be addressed.
These challenges can be resolved by implementing a phone based system similar to the
one currently being used in Australia. During the 2010 federal election, Australia used an
in-polling station method of telephone based voting that allowed visually impaired persons
to vote in private. Just like non-blind voters, visually impaired voters would still be required
to vote inside a voting center to verify their identity. However, rather than casting their vote
in a voting booth, a voting assistant would escort them to a private area with a telephone.
Another election official would be on the other end of the phone that would read the ballot to
the blind person, and record their responses. To ensure that the voter’s choices were correctly
recorded, a second election official listened to the phone call and watched as the votes were
marked (AEC, 2010). Using this method would not only address the Danish government’s
concerns regarding voter privacy, but would also meet the criteria that an election official is
present to ensure that the voter’s choice was correctly registered. Furthermore, because the
system crashed in Canada were due to overwhelming traffic, it is unlikely that a telephone
system such as the one implemented in Australia would suffer similar problems if its use is
limited to visually impaired persons.
A telephone-based voting system can be further modified to output a paper ballot, in
accordance with the desires of the Danish government. Rather than have the election official
on the other end record the vote electronically, they could fill out a paper ballot. Doing
so would address the Danish government’s main argument against electronic systems. If a
printer was in the same room as the voter, it would also be possible to modify the system
such that it prints the ballot for the voter to turn in at the polling place. This would allow a
visually impaired person to cast their ballot in the same manner as a non-blind individual.
Furthermore, there is no disruption to the infrastructure already in place for counting votes,
which will likely increase the chance that the Danish government approves a telephone based
system, should it be recommended to the Danish Association of the Blind.
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Internet Voting
A reliable internet-based voting system can greatly improve the electoral process. One of
the most commonly cited benefits of internet voting systems is the tendency to increase
voter participation. In a manner similar to postal voting, internet voting allows voters to
vote whenever they please. By eliminating hindering factors, such as finding the time or
transportation to travel to the polling station, or the inconvenience of waiting in crowded
polling centers, internet voting has been shown to increase voter turnout significantly. In the
2000 Democratic Primary, Arizona experienced a 200% growth in voter turnout following
the implementation of an internet based voting system (Blanger & Carter, 2010). While
increase in voter participation in general is a good indicator of a voting systems success, an
increase in participation within groups that are typically in frequent voters is a much more
important indicator of success.
Turnout among young voters is consistently the lowest among all age groups. Election
statistics around the world show that voter turnout between the ages of 18-25 is often
less than half of that of older age groups (UK Electoral Comission, 2002; Nasrallah, 2011;
US Census Bureau, 2011). Even in Denmark, with its comparatively high turnout rates,
voter participation among youths is lower than every age group besides voters over the age
of 80(Jørgen Elklit & Togeby, 2005). According to many proponents of internet voting,
the option to vote online could lead to significantly higher voter turnout among young
voters. Belanger believes that internet voting “has the potential to increase turnout among
individuals between the ages of 18-25.” Belanger goes on to explain that, given the youth’s
proficiency with using the internet and the idea of being able to use the latest technology,
would make online voting popular among them (Blanger & Carter, 2010).
Furthermore, the ability to vote online provides a means for those with visual impairments
to vote. Any visually impaired voter with access to a computer with a screen reader should
be able to cast their vote online (Hall, 2001). Furthermore, being able to vote online would
eliminate many user interface issues that blind voters may have with other electronic voting
machines. So long as the layout of the webpage is usable by the visually impaired, they
should have no problem navigating an online ballot.
Although there are many benefits to implementing an internet based voting system, it
has long been surrounded by controversy. The primary concern with internet voting is
security, and rightly so. The internet is filled with vulnerabilities that could allow hackers
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to tamper with an election. For example, in 2010, when Washington D.C. tested an internet
voting system, students from the University of Michigan hacked the system and skewed the
votes such that a “Star Wars” character became one of the options on the ballot (Barnes,
2010). When developing an internet based voting system for American soldiers abroad, the
Department of Defense concluded that internet voting was too unreliable for significant use
(Gideon, 2009). Indeed, internet voting is susceptible to many different forms of hacking
such as viruses, worms, and denial of service attacks that can in effect prevent people from
voting or even skew the results of an election (Jefferson et al., 2004).
While external threats can disrupt the voting process, insider attack perpetrated by the
manufacturers on the voting software can cause even more damage to an internet based
voting system. Without a paper trail that can be audited, internet based voting systems
suffer from many of the same problems as DRE machines, in that the voter must place
absolute trust in the system they are using (Schryen & Volkamer, 2010).
Furthermore, while voting online allows voters to cast their vote in private, there exists
the possibility that the voter may choose to voluntarily eschew their right to privacy. If they
simply print the webpage showing how they voted, they can use that as evidence that they
voted for a particular candidate. This opens up the possibility that voters can either be
intimidated or bribed into voting for one candidate or another. As stated before the use of a
secret ballot while voting must be mandated in order for an election to be fair. If an internet
voting system does not meet this requirement than the validity of the election results must
be called into question.
Despite these criticisms, some countries have managed to carry out successful elections
using the internet. The most prominent of these countries is Estonia, the first, and so far
only, country to carry out a binding national election online. Since 2005, all registered voters
in Estonia have been able to vote in national elections through the internet. International
investigations into these elections have shown that they were conducted without any hacking
or other malicious action affecting the integrity of the system (ENEC, 2009). Furthermore,
there were virtually no complaints of the election process filed by the voters.
There are many factors that contributed to the success of the Estonian voting system.
Arguably the most innovative factor is the actual process of voting. Almost all Estonian
citizens possess a government issued ID card that is used or multiple purposes, such as for
health insurance, or as a credit card, driver’s license, et cetera (ENEC, 2009). By inserting
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the ID card into a special card reader attached to a computer, an Estonian voter is also able
to access the voting webpage. While the card reader must be purchased individually, they
are relatively cheap, costing only 15 USD. Furthermore, many Estonians already have a card
reader, as it has many other uses besides voting in elections. Once the voting website has
been accessed, the voter is presented with the Internet ballot which looks similar to a regular
paper ballot. After the voter has selected their vote they are presented with a confirmation
screen. Once the voter confirms their vote it is sent to a voting server.
What makes the Estonian system inventive, though, is that the voter is allowed to vote
as many times as they please. In order to prevent citizens from voting multiple times the
system only counts the most recent vote cast. The ability to vote multiple times provides
many benefits. For one, if a voter feels uncomfortable with how they voted, for one reason or
another, they can change their vote at any time. If they feel they may have voted incorrectly,
they need only navigate back to the web page and recast the ballot. Secondly, being able
to vote multiple times eliminates the possibility of voter intimidation or vote selling. Even
though a voter will still be able to print out a page detailing how they voted, they can
change that vote at any time which means that it is impossible for the voter to proof of
vote to another person (Schryen & Volkamer, 2010). Furthermore, if the voter is at any
time uncomfortable with voting online, they may cast their vote at a polling station on
election day by traditional paper ballot, even if they already voted online. If they voted
online previously, that vote is voided, and only their paper ballot vote is counted.
Figure 11: Security System Used by Estonia in Internet Voting
(http://www.vvk.ee/public/dok/Internet Voting in Estonia.pdf)
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The Estonian system also has measures in place to help reduce the possibility of hacking,
as well as safeguard the privacy of the voter. As seen in Figure 11, Estonia has a multi-
layered security system in place to ensure that election results cannot be altered. When the
vote is cast, the information on the ballot is stored in an encrypted digital “envelope.” This
“envelope” is then placed in a second encrypted “envelope” that contains a verification code
to prove that the vote is coming from the correct registered voter. Once the “envelope”
reaches the main server, and the polls close, it is decrypted and the verifying information is
checked against other ballots to make sure that only the last vote cast is counted. The veri-
fying information is then discarded to ensure voter privacy. The first “envelope” containing
the voter’s choices is placed on a CD-ROM containing other votes in a randomized order.
After being transported to a secondary computer that is not connected to the internet, the
“envelopes” are decrypted, and the results tallied. This multi-layered security system has
helped to prevent tampering with the three Estonian elections that have been held by an
online vote (ENEC, 2009). The Estonian voting system has proven that conducting secure
elections online is possible if proper precautions are taken.
4.1.5 Summary of Voting Systems
In conclusion, there are many different methods of voting used around the world that allow
the visually impaired to vote in private. The most accessible among these voting systems
are those that are electronic in nature, but these types of voting systems often have trust
and security issues that need to be addressed. Voting schemes that involve paper ballots
are widely considered more secure than purely electronic systems, but require secondary
systems, such ballot markers, in order to make them usable by visually impaired voters.
4.2 Research on Voting Systems in Organizations
The bulk of our research on accessible voting methods in Danish organizations was derived
from interviews with visually impaired voters. While the focus of the interviews with the
visually impaired voters was to determine which methods of voting in state elections would
be most acceptable, the interviews provided us with an opportunity to discuss how the
interviewees participated in elections in their respective organizations, and whether or not
such practices could be improved.
Interestingly, while the majority of the subjects participated in elections or votes where
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their vote was secret, the overall opinion among the subjects was that private voting within
organizations and corporations was not a major concern. The cause behind this indifference
stemmed from the fact that private votes were rarely conducted within the subjects organi-
zations. When secret voting was held, the subjects often were able to request the assistance
of a friend or trusted individual to cast their vote for them. In these cases, the subjects as
a whole did not feel that their privacy was being infringed upon. It seems then, that the
issue of private voting in organizational and corporate elections is not as big a problem as
previously thought, however it is one that should still be addressed.
There were a few methods that were discussed that allowed visually impaired voters
to vote in private in organizational elections. The most common methods still involved
paper ballots. Many subjects stated that if the vote being held was a simple “yes-no” vote,
the simplest method of ensuring privacy and usability was by marking a note card. While
marking the ballot may seem difficult for those who are blind, the process can be simplified
if a simply dash is used to represent a yes vote, and a blank ballot to represent a no vote.
Doing so does not require the ability to see what is being written, allowing visually impaired
voters to cast their vote independently and privately.
Elections involving multiple choices require a more complex system. The Danish As-
sociation of the Blind uses braille booklets for these types of elections. Each page in the
booklets contains a number in both braille and print. When an election is to be held, the
person running the election assigns each possible choice a number. The voters then navigate
to the page containing the number representing their choice, tear it out, and place it in a
bag or envelope. Even though the majority blind people are not braille literate, the braille
booklets are still usable, as the only the numbers one through ten need to be learned in
braille. Indeed, even the subjects who were not braille literate stated that they had used
braille books before with little troubles.
While physical ballots do offer many advantages in smaller organizations, when deal
with large memberships, the process of collecting and counting the votes become tedious.
Audience response systems (ARS) have often been used at conferences and in universities
when presenters are dealing with large groups of people. While the purpose of audience
response systems are make presentations more interesting by allowing the audience to interact
with the presentation, they can be used to allow visually impaired voters to vote in large
organizations and corporations. The most common type of ARS, some examples of which can
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Figure 12: ResponseCard and Reply Mini Audience Response Clickers (Turning
Technologies & TeamTalk)
be seen in Figure 12, uses a handheld remote, or “clicker”, with multiple buttons on its front
face. When a presenter asks a multiple choice question, audience members press the button
corresponding to their desired choice. The clicker then wirelessly sends the participant’s
selection to the main computer that the presenter is using for their presentation, where the
results are calculated in real time.
Besides eliminating the need to manually pass out, collect, and count the ballots, ARS
can also be modified to be more accessible to the visually impaired. Normally, an ARS clicker
will notify the participant that their vote has been received by the main computer by lighting
up an LED. Some ARS manufacturers, however, have modified their respective clickers to
contain a small vibration motor so that the visually impaired are able to determine if their
vote was counted. Furthermore, although we could find no ARS on the market that had
the capability to do so, it should be relatively simple to include a headphone jack on the
handheld clicker. The clicker could read off what button was pressed by the voter, allowing
those who are visually impaired to be certain that their vote was correctly cast.
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4.3 Stakeholder Analysis
In order to determine what each of our stakeholders desired in a voting system, we conducted
an in depth analysis into the major stakeholders involved in our project. These stakeholders
were both visually impaired and sighted Danish voters, the Danish government, and organi-
zations and corporations within Denmark. For Danish voters and the Danish government,
we conducted interviews and surveys, in addition to significant background research, in order
to determine which voting system each stakeholder preferred. For Danish organizations and
corporations, we used interviews with visually impaired voters in order to determine the best
methods of voting in organizational elections. We will discuss and analyze our findings in
the subsections below.
4.3.1 Visually Impaired Voters
The stakeholder analysis of visually impaired voters was conducted through interviews with
seven visually impaired voters. As stated in the Methodology section, we split the interviews
into three topics, each covering what we deemed to be an important aspect of our project.
The first of these topics focused on the current and previous process for visually impaired
voting in Denmark. The second topic involved describing different visually-impaired acces-
sible voting systems and discussing the subject’s opinions on such systems. The final topic
revolved around how the subject participated in voting in organizations they were a member
of. When answering questions about voting in organizations, however, the subjects acted as
visually impaired members of organizations, rather than visually impaired voters. Therefore,
in the following subsections, we will include an analysis on the subjects’ responses to on the
first two topics.
Voting in Denmark
All of the visually impaired subjects that we interviewed stated that they were frequent
voters in Danish elections, and have participated in elections since they were of legal voting
age. While two of the subjects became blind later in life, the responses from these interviews
indicate that many visually impaired are not discouraged from an active political life due to
their disability. Rather, those with visual impairments take voting just as seriously as those
without any disabilities.
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Furthermore, all of the subjects stated that they have voted with an election official
present. Of the seven subjects, four stated that they were deeply dissatisfied with the
requirement that an election official assist visually impaired voters in filling out their ballot.
While the most common explanation for this opinion was the breach of privacy, others stated
that forcing three people into the tiny voting booth created an uncomfortably “crammed”
environment. It was also brought up that, because the voter’s choice had to be heard and
confirmed by two people, the visually impaired voter and the election official would often
speak in a louder voice. As the voting booths are close together, someone standing in a
nearby voting booth could easily determine who the visually impaired voter was voting for.
Three of the subjects stated that they were satisfied or indifferent with the requirement
that an election official be present in the voting booth to assist visually impaired voters.
When asked about this, the subjects stated that, while their right to privacy was being
violated, they trusted the election officials to not modify their vote, or discuss their vote
with others. The subjects did state that if a well-tested voting system that would allow
them to vote is implemented, they would prefer such a system over the current one.
Interestingly, all seven subjects stated that they were satisfied with the previous method
of voting, where they were able to bring a trusted individual into the voting booth with them,
rather than an election official. Many felt that the previous system provided a sufficient level
of privacy during the voting process, and one subject even stated that they would prefer the
previous system to any of the voting machines or technologies we presented.
What this seems to indicate is that the primary privacy concerns by visually impaired
voters over the current system is not based around the fact that someone knows who they
voted for. Instead, the issue lies in the fact that it is a stranger, whom the voter may know
nothing about nor trust, who is assisting them through the election process. While the
previous system still did not allow visually impaired voters to vote independently, they were
still able to choose who was to assist them. With the current system, the inability to choose
who is to enter the voting booth with the voter only further strips away their independence
while voting. This seems to indicate that the frustration with the current voting process
stems not only from a lack of privacy, but from a lack of voter independence.
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Alternative Methods of Voting
While opinions on each voting system varied from subject to subject, each of the seven
subjects stated that braille ballots should not be used as a substitute for the current voting
system. Even though five to the subjects were able to read braille, they confirmed that
much of the blind population is not braille literate. Indeed, the subjects estimated that
only 5-20% of the blind population could read braille. Because of this fact, the subjects
universally stated that a braille voting system would be unusable by the majority of the
blind population. Furthermore, they felt that a braille system would limit the choice of
the voter to voting only for parties, as it would be too large and cumbersome to use if each
candidate from each party were to be placed on the ballot. The subjects unanimously agreed
that Denmark should not implement braille ballots or braille templates in state elections.
Regarding electronic voting system, opinions among the subjects were far more varied.
Five of the seven subjects stated that they would trust a DRE system to be used in state
elections if it had been thoroughly tested and approved by the Danish government. They
stated that DRE machines would be accessible enough for a visually impaired person to use
on their own, and thought it was a step forward from the current method of voting. Others
were less trusting on DRE machines. Two of the subjects cited problems with DRE machines
in the 2000 US election as evidence that a purely electronic voting system is too insecure to
use. Even if the Danish government approved the DRE voting system, the subjects stated
that too much was at stake to trust an electronic machine to properly record the votes.
Interestingly, one of the subjects said they were unsure whether they had the technical
expertise to navigate an electronic ballot. This concern was addressed when we described
DRE systems as computers rather than specialized voting systems. This is important to
note, as it is likely that many blind voters, especially older ones, may feel that they lack the
technical knowledge to use an electronic voting machine. Many of these voters, however, have
used a computer with a screen reader before. If an electronic voting system is to be trusted
by these voters, steps must be taken to inform them that using a DRE voting machine is just
like using a personal computer. Doing so will likely reduce some of the concerns associated
with using electronic machines.
Just as with DRE machines, five out of the seven subjects stated that they would feel
comfortable using a ballot marking system, and would trust it to be used in state elections.
However, the two subjects who felt that a ballot marking device would not be a sufficient
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method of voting were not the same two subjects who would not feel comfortable using a DRE
voting machine. Likewise, the reasons given for their disapproval of ballot markers did not
stem from security concerns. Rather, both felt that a ballot marker would be too complicated
a system for the average visually impaired voter to use. As both subjects supported the use
of DRE machines, they felt that the additional steps taken by ballot markers to produce the
paper ballot were unneeded and would lead to more problems than they would solve. Just
as with DRE machines, this means that steps must be taken to ensure that ballot marking
devices are as simple to use as possible. Voters should also be informed beforehand of how to
properly operate such systems if they are going to be accepted by visually impaired voters.
It is also important to look at why the two subjects who did not trust DRE machines
would feel comfortable using a ballot marker. They stated that the production of the paper
ballot was reason for this change. While they did say that they would prefer some method
of verifying that the printed ballot was had the correct information printed, this was not
absolutely necessary. This change in opinion underlines the importance of a paper ballot in
the voting process. Even though the two subjects would not necessarily be able to read the
ballot and verify that it was correctly marked, the presence of the paper ballot still improved
their trust in the system. This indicates that a voting machine will be more widely accepted
if a paper ballot is involved in the voting process.
While all of the subjects felt that that a telephone based system would provide an accept-
able level of privacy, only three of the subjects felt that it would be an acceptable method
of voting. Only one of the subjects stated that they would be strongly satisfied with using
a telephone based voting system. The subject noted that they felt it would be the most
usable of all the discussed voting systems because nearly every blind person has experience
using telephones. Therefore, it should be easy for a visually impaired voter to use. Others,
however, had different opinions regarding voting by telephone. The majority of the subjects
felt that such a system would be more complicated than was necessary, and would prefer
something much simpler to use. Again, this emphasizes the importance of simplicity in a
voting system. If a voting system is too complex or even perceived to be too complicated to
use, it is unlikely to be accepted by the voting population.
Just like telephone based voting, few of the subjects stated that they would feel comfort-
able casting their ballot online. One of the subjects that favored an internet based voting
system cited recent elections in Estonia as evidence that such a system, could be effective.
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Others were less sure, saying that there were too many security concerns associated with
online voting. Many feared that it would be susceptible to hacking or other forms of election
fraud. Overall, interviews with visually impaired voters show that significant hurdles would
need to be overcome in order for an internet based system to be accepted.
Following the interviews, we compiled all of the gathered data and made a spreadsheet
containing each subject’s attitudes towards each voting system. We used this data to create
a simple graph representing the number of subjects who would accept a given voting system
to be used, and the number of subjects who would prefer that voting system be used over
any other. This graph, seen in Figure 13, tells us two things.
Figure 13: Graph of visually impaired voter opinions for each voting system
First, while all of the subjects consider a move back to voting with a trusted individual
acceptable, few prefer it over alternative methods of voting. Therefore, while a quick and
easy solution may be to simply revert back to the older method of voting for the visually
impaired, doing so is not necessarily the best way to address the problem.
Second, although and the number of subject who would find a DRE machine acceptable is
the same as the number who would find a ballot marker acceptable, no subject would prefer
a DRE machine to a ballot marker. This indicates that, while the presence of a paper ballot
is not necessary for visually impaired voters to trust an electronic voting system, having a
voting system that produces a paper ballot makes that system far more desirable. Indeed,
the ballot markers were the most preferred method of voting overall, with four of the seven
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subjects stating that they would rather use a ballot marker than the other voting systems.
From our gathered data on the opinions of visually impaired voters regarding different
methods of voting, a few notable findings stand out. First, only three of the voting systems
were considered acceptable by the majority of the subjects. These systems are:
• The previous method of voting, where visually impaired voters are able to choose who
can enter the voting booth with them.
• Direct Recording Electronic voting machines.
• Electronic machines that print or mark a paper ballot.
While some subjects did favor the other voting systems, overall, the majority of subjects
felt that the above three voting systems were preferable alternatives. As this project is
focused on finding an acceptable voting method for visually impaired voters, it is likely that
our recommendations will involve at least one of these three voting systems.
Second, the majority of the concerns over DRE and internet based voting systems focused
around the security of the system. Indeed, when we asked the subjects if they would feel
comfortable or trust using a DRE machine, the common response was that they would feel
comfortable only if the government had extensively tested the system beforehand. Similarly,
while one subject was enthusiastic about the possibility of voting online, the majority stated
that they felt that online voting would not be secure from hacking or tampering. Therefore,
it is clear that if a voting system is to be accepted by visually impaired voters, significant
measures must be taken to ensure that the voting system is not vulnerable to external
threats.
Finally, if a voting system is not easy to use, it is unlikely that it will be accepted by
visually impaired voters. The majority of concerns with ballot marking and telephone based
systems originated from their complexity. The subjects felt that the voting systems would be
too complicated for a visually impaired voter to easily operate. Therefore, it is not enough
that a voting system be accessible to visually impaired voters. Instead, visually impaired
voters must be able to use a voting system just as easily as a sighted voter would. This
includes not only implementing an interface that is straightforward to visually impaired
voter, but also simplifying the entire voting process by minimizing the number of steps that
need to be taken in order to vote. Furthermore, visually impaired voters must be informed
of the voting machines simplicity or ease of use beforehand. It is important, however, that
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the explanation of how to operate the voting machine is likewise, simple and easy to follow.
Rather than describe every single step in the voting process for ballot marking devices,
we found that subjects were more favorable towards such voting machines when we only
described the major steps. We can therefore infer that it is not only important that the
voting system itself be simple, but visually impaired voters must perceive it to be simple if
it is to be a successful voting system.
4.3.2 Non-Blind Danish Voters
If an electronic voting system is to be implemented in Denmark, it is likely that it will affect
all Danish voters, not just the visually impaired. Therefore, we surveyed a large number of
sighted Danish voters on their opinions of different methods of electronic voting, including
DRE systems, ballot markers, and internet based voting.
While we were only able to survey 17 non-blind voters, the gathered data was consistent.
Simply stated, many Danish voters did not care whether or not they voted through any
sort of electronic voting system, so long as it was deemed secure by the Danish government.
Indeed, 15 of the 17 surveyed voters stated that they would trust using all three systems in a
state election. Interestingly, the two other voters stated that they would not trust any of the
three voting systems, even if the government considered them secure. The responses from the
survey indicate that the many Danish voters would be perfectly content with voting through
an electronic voting system. Still, not all Danish voters would feel comfortable casting their
ballot on an electronic voting system. We must make sure, then, that when we recommend a
system of voting to the Danish Association of the Blind, that we are not enabling one group
of voters to vote while disenfranchising another.
4.3.3 The Danish Government
A stakeholder analysis on the Danish government was completed to not only determine which
methods of voting the government found acceptable, but also to ascertain what needs to be
done in order to make other voting systems acceptable for use in Denmark. This analysis
was completed through two methods: background research and discussions with members of
the Danish government.
We conducted significant background research into the Danish government’s positions
towards different methods of voting. These positions were gathered by researching publicly
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released statements and documents, such as “Parliamentary Electoral System in Denmark”,
released by the Ministry of the Interior in 2011. While this document did not specifically
state the Danish government’s views towards each method of voting, we were able to come
to a number of conclusions by analyzing the information in the document.
While the Danish national government trusts and uses electronic logbooks to keep a count
of the number of registered voters that participate in each election, they do not share the same
level of trust for electronic voting machines. Indeed, while mayors of eight different Danish
municipalities requested that electronic voting systems be allowed in national election, the
Danish Ministry of Social Welfare refused, stating that they were opposed to “a replacement
of the current public control” of the vote counting with a “more sophisticated control of
the electronic counting of votes that only specialists knowledgeable of IT-systems could
reasonably undertake (MISA, 2009).” The Ministry of Social Affairs went on to state that
they would need to see electronic voting systems used successfully in other countries before
they would consider “embarking on pilot projects” for electronic voting systems.
The government’s primary concern with electronic voting machines seems to be the re-
quired change in infrastructure due to the lack of a paper ballot. This indicates that the
Ministry of Social Affairs is concerned primarily with DRE voting systems, as the paper
ballots produced by ballot marking devices address this concern. Still, the Ministry of Social
Affairs has made it clear that they do not want to see any overly complex or technical voting
systems used in elections, and ballot markers still would require some technical knowledge to
set up or repair should one break down during an election. While some of the concerns with
electronic system may be addressed by having the voting machine produce a paper ballot,
the Danish government is still likely to be wary of their use.
Similarly, the Danish Ministry of the Interior is opposed to remote electronic voting
systems, such as through internet voting systems. In the Ministry’s remarks on the law that
allowed for electronic registers to be used, they discussed the possibility of internet based
voting. In these discussions, the Ministry of the Interior concluded that online voting was
not a possibility in the near future due to the inability of the government to securely verify
the identity of the voter. There is no way to ensure that the person casting the vote is who
they say they are. Furthermore, it cannot be certain that the voter casting their vote is
doing so in private. The Ministry of the Interior stated that the inability to guarantee that
the voter will cast their vote in private precludes the usage of online voting, and that“secret
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balloting is not only a right for the voter but also a duty.”
Indeed, the Ministry of the Interior notes that it is the duty of the election officials to
“ensure not only the identity of the voter” but to guarantee that “the vote is cast without
giving others the opportunity to see how the voter has voted.” The idea that secret ballots
must be mandatory is common throughout the document. While a postal voting system
is present in Denmark, two election officials must be present when the voter is filling out
the ballot, even if they are perfectly sighted. The Danish government places a high level of
importance in the secrecy of the voter’s ballot, and because of this, the Danish government
is opposed to voting systems where either the identity of the voter cannot be confirmed, or
where the voter’s ballot may become public.
The opinions in the above document were echoed by members of the Ministry of the
Interior when we met with them to discuss electronic voting machines. Members of the
Ministry of the Interior stated that one of the primary concerns with electronic voting systems
stems from the lack of a paper ballot. Indeed, while they noted that there were many benefits
to DRE systems, the absence of a physical paper trail likely ensures that DRE systems will
not be accepted by the Danish government in the near future.
Members of the Ministry of the Interior did, however, seem more open to the possibility
of accepting an electronic voting machine that produced some sort of voter verifiable paper
trail, as is the case in ballot marking devices. Indeed, one member of the Ministry of the
Interior stated that the likelihood of the government testing some sort of electronic voting
system is growing, and that if the government was to use an electronic voting machine, it
would have to produce a paper ballot. While it is important to note that these statements
cannot be taken in official capacity, it does validate the concerns that the Ministry of the
Interior has over DRE systems. Furthermore, it does show that the Danish government is
open to implementing newer, more accessible voting machines, provided they meet all of the
requirements put forth by Danish law.
4.4 Critique of Voting Systems
In this section, we compare and critique the different methods of voting with the respect to
the information gathered during our stakeholder analysis. By looking at what qualities each
stakeholder would like to see in a voting system, we are able to determine which method of
voting is most suitable for use in Danish elections.
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4.4.1 Paper Ballots
While both the Danish government and sighted voters find the current method of voting,
wherein a traditional paper ballot is used, to be acceptable, a paper ballot does not allow
the visually impaired to vote in private. In order to vote with a paper ballot, a visually
impaired voter requires outside assistance. Visually impaired voters did, however, state that
this requirement would be acceptable if they were allowed to choose who was to assist them.
Allowing visually impaired voters to once again choose a trusted individual to enter the
polling booth with them would be the least expensive and simplest method of meeting the
privacy desires of visually impaired voters. Still, paper ballots do not allow visually impaired
voters a secret ballot, and the majority of the visually impaired voters interviewed stated
that they would rather vote through a system that allows them to vote independently and
privately. Therefore, we believe that the Danish Association of the Blind should only push
for a return to the previous system, where blind voters could choose someone to enter the
booth with them, if electronic voting systems are not approved by the Danish government.
4.4.2 Braille Ballots
While braille ballots may seem like a viable option for providing visually impaired voters with
a means to vote in private, background research and an analysis of the opinions of visually
impaired voters reveal the inadequacies of braille ballots. The largest problem associated
with braille ballots is that only 10% of the blind population is braille literate. This means
that if a braille ballot is used in elections, it will be inaccessible to the majority of blind
voters. Furthermore, the length of a braille ballot or template would limit the choice of those
voters who are braille literate by only allowing for a party to be chosen, not an individual
candidate. For these reasons, we do not believe that a braille ballot would be an acceptable
replacement to the current method of voting in Danish elections.
4.4.3 Mechanical Voting Systems
Although mechanical voting systems are still used in some parts of the world, they are widely
considered to be obsolete and outdated. Furthermore, they would be unable to offer any
real improvement over the current method of voting to any of our stakeholders. They are
not accessible by the visually impaired and offer no paper trail that can be audited. Because
background research into mechanical voting systems returned so many negatives, and very
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few positives, associated with using them, we did not feel it necessary to ask stakeholders
about mechanical voting systems. Therefore, we cannot recommend that mechanical voting
systems be used in Denmark.
4.4.4 DRE Systems
Direct Recording Electronic voting systems present a potential solution to the challenge
of providing private voting to the visually impaired. DRE systems are fully accessible by
those who are blind or partially sighted, as well as those who are aﬄicted with a number of
other physical and mental disabilities. Furthermore, DRE systems can prevent voters from
accidentally over-voting or under-voting, resulting in a spoiled ballot. DRE systems also
have the advantage of being able to calculate election results instantly and automatically,
eliminating the need to hire election officials to count votes by hand.
Unfortunately, there are many issues with DRE systems that must be addressed before
they can be used in Denmark. The primary criticism of DRE machines is security, in partic-
ular the lack of a voter verifiable paper trail. We have found in our research that the absence
of a paper ballot results in the system being vulnerable to hacking or tampering without the
knowledge of the voter. Furthermore, the Danish Ministry of the interior confirmed that any
voting system that lacked a paper trail would almost certainly be rejected by parliament.
Therefore it seems unlikely that DRE systems would be accepted by the Danish government,
were we to recommend them.
4.4.5 Ballot Markers
While ballot markers are not yet as widely used as DRE machines, the advantages that
they have over paperless electronic voting systems cannot be understated. Simply put, the
production of a paper ballot solves most of the problems attributed to DRE machines, while
retaining nearly all of the benefits that make DRE machines attractive. Because they are
electronic, ballot markers are able to reduce or eliminate common voter errors that result in
spoiled ballots. Furthermore, they are just as accessible to voters with disabilities as DRE
machines. But by printing a paper ballot, ballot markers offer the security and trust that
DRE machines lack.
Our research and analysis has led us to conclude that ballot marking devices are more
secure than DRE machines because any error can be clearly seen by the voter. In effect,
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ballot markers are simply a high-tech and accessible pencil. Any tampering with a ballot
marker that leads to an incorrect printing of the ballot could easily be detected by the voter
before their choice is cast. For visually impaired voters, it would be trivial to print a barcode
on the ballot that could be read by any barcode scanner to ensure that the vote was properly
printed. Because of the ability to ensure that their vote is properly counted, ballot marking
devices were the most popular of all the research voting systems among visually impaired
voters.
The Danish government agrees with the importance of a paper ballot in the voting pro-
cess. Indeed, members of the Ministry of the Interior made it clear that any electronic voting
system would likely need to produce a voter verifiable paper trail if it was to be accepted
by the Danish government. This requirement stems not only from the general trust of the
paper ballot, but also from the fact that the current electoral infrastructure is based around
the paper ballot. Ballot markers would require a minimal change to the electoral process
and could even be used side-by-side with the traditional method of voting.
While the issue of printers jamming would need to be addressed if ballot markers are to
be used on a national level, we believe that this problem is one that can be resolved. Overall,
however, the benefits associated with ballot markers far outweigh the downsides, a belief that
many of our stakeholders share. Therefore, we believe that the Danish Association should
push for ballot markers to be used in Danish elections.
4.4.6 Postal Voting
There are several aspects of postal voting that could help in accommodating the needs of
visually impaired voters. By being able to vote in the comfort of one’s own home, visually
impaired voters would no longer need to find transportation to polling stations. Nor would
they need to vote at a specified time. Instead, they could take as long as they wished to
complete the ballot. Furthermore, because postal ballots are a paper system, they are both
inexpensive and auditable.
Being a paper based system, however, postal ballots are still not entirely accessible to
the visually impaired. A visually impaired voter would still require assistance in filling out
the ballot. While this could be done by a trusted individual, given that current Danish law
requires that an election official be present if any Danish citizen, even a perfectly sighted
one, wishes to fill out a postal ballot from their own home, it is unlikely that the Danish
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government would allow visually impaired voters will be able to choose who assists them.
Therefore, postal ballots would present no real change in the level of privacy afforded to
visually impaired voters.
4.4.7 Telephone Voting
Our original research suggested that telephone based voting systems were potentially an
acceptable solution to the issue of visually impaired voter privacy. Furthermore, because
some telephone based voting systems, such as the one used in Australia, involve multiple
election officials throughout the voting process, we believed that a telephone based voting
system would be acceptable by the Danish government.
Our stakeholder analysis, however, demonstrated that a telephone based voting system
would likely not be well-received by visually impaired voters. While some visually impaired
voters did feel that it provided an adequate level of privacy, many were concerned over the
complexity of telephone based systems, and felt that they provided limited benefits when
compared to other voting systems. Furthermore, the implementation of a telephone based
voting system would likely be too cost-ineffective if only a small fraction of the population
would benefit from using it.
4.4.8 Internet Voting
Or research has indicated that, while internet voting has many benefits associated with its
use, significant challenges will need to be overcome if it is to be implemented in Denmark.
The largest of these challenges is making sure they system is absolutely secure. While Estonia
has successfully used a secure internet based voting system, such systems have been met with
mixed success in other countries.
Visually impaired voters, however, did not believe that an internet based voting system
would be acceptable. Trust and security issues associated with the internet led online voting
systems to be among the least popular of the researched methods among visually impaired
voters. As this project is aimed towards visually impaired voters, if so few of them would
accept an internet based voting system, it is unlikely that implementing such a system would
be successful if it is so ill-received by blind voters.
Interestingly, though, sighted Danish voters responded favorably to the possibility of
voting online. Indeed, the majority of sighted voters surveyed stated that they would prefer
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to vote online over other forms of electronic voting machines, such as DREs or ballot markers.
The one stipulation was that they would only trust such a voting system if testing by the
Danish government had proven it to be secure. This indicates that the Danish people place
a great deal of trust in their government, and if the government trusts a voting system, the
Danish populace will too.
Unfortunately, the Danish government does not seem to trust online voting schemes
at this time. The Ministry of the Interior stated, in their 2011 report on parliamentary
elections in Denmark, that they do not believe an internet based voting system should be
used in Denmark, at least for the time being. Therefore, it is unlikely that an online voting
system would be accepted by the Danish government if we recommend it to the Danish
Association of the Blind.
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5 Conclusions and Recommendations
The primary goal of this project was to recommend a method, or methods, of voting that
allow visually impaired individuals in Denmark to vote in state and organizational elections
in private. Following the background research into different methods of accessible voting, a
detailed stakeholder analysis, and a thorough critiquing of the voting systems with respect to
our stakeholders desires, we have provided some recommendations to the Danish Association
of the Blind. These recommendations, seen below, offer a course of action for the Danish
Association of the Blind to follow to help implement an accessible method of voting in state
elections. Furthermore, we recommend a series of best practices for voting in organizations
with visually impaired members present.
5.1 Voting in State Elections
While ballot markers are not yet as widely used as DRE machines, the advantages that
they have over paperless electronic voting systems cannot be understated. Simply put, the
production of a paper ballot solves most of the problems attributed to DRE machines, while
retaining nearly all of the benefits that make DRE machines attractive. Because they are
electronic, ballot markers are able to reduce or eliminate common voter errors that result in
spoiled ballots. Furthermore, they are just as accessible to voters with disabilities as DRE
machines. But by printing a paper ballot, ballot markers offer the security and trust that
DRE machines lack.
Our research and analysis has led us to conclude that ballot marking devices are more
secure than DRE machines because any error can be clearly seen by the voter. In effect,
ballot markers are simply a high-tech and accessible pencil. Any tampering with a ballot
marker that leads to an incorrect printing of the ballot can easily be detected by the voter
before their ballot is cast. For visually impaired voters, a barcode containing the voter’s
choices could be printed at the top of the ballot. This barcode could be read back to the
voter by a barcode scanner to ensure that the vote was properly printed. Because of the
ability to ensure that their vote is properly counted, ballot marking devices were the most
popular of all the voting systems that visually impaired voters were asked about.
The Danish government agrees that the paper ballot is an important part of the voting
process. Indeed, members of the Ministry of the Interior made it clear that any electronic
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voting system would likely need to produce a voter verifiable paper trail if it was to be
accepted by the Danish government. This requirement stems not only from the general trust
of the paper ballot, but also from the fact that the current electoral infrastructure is based
around the paper ballot. Ballot markers would require a minimal change to the electoral
process and could even be used side-by-side with the traditional method of voting. While
the issue of printers jamming would need to be addressed if ballot markers are to be used
on a national level, we believe that this problem is one that can be resolved by having back
up printers present at each polling station.
Overall, we have found that the benefits associated with ballot markers far outweigh the
caveats, a belief that many of our stakeholders share. Therefore, we believe that the Danish
Association should push for ballot markers to be used in Danish elections.
5.2 Voting in Organizational Elections
From our findings, we have determined that visually impaired accessible voting methods can
easily be implemented in organizations and corporations. There is, however, no one method
of voting that is suitable in every type of organization for every type of election. Therefore,
we will explain the best voting practices given several types of voting scenarios.
If the organizations is small (consisting of less than 30 members) and the vote is based
around a simple yes-no topic, a basic pen and paper method should be employed by the
organization. Even though blind members of the organization will not be able to see the pen
or paper, any marking on the paper could be used to represent either a yes or a no. Further-
more, because the only materials required are pens, papers, and a ballot box, this method
of voting is not only accessible to the visually impaired, but also simple and inexpensive.
If the organization is still small, but the vote involves more than one possible choice,
then the braille booklet method should be used. While our research has shown that not all
visually impaired people can read braille fluently, only number one to ten would need to be
known to use a braille booklet. Indeed, in the interviews with blind voters, we learned that
even those who were not literate in braille were able to use the braille booklets with relative
ease. Furthermore, because the number is printed in both braille and ink, braille booklets
are also usable by sighted voters.
If the organization is large (over 30 members) than we believe that the organization
should investigate the possibility of using audience response systems in private elections.
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While audience response systems can be expensive (costing anywhere from US$30 to US$150
per clicker), they can significantly improve the process of voting in large organizations and
corporations, even if visually impaired members are not present. Audience response systems
reduce the time associated with collecting and counting votes because they are completely
electronic in nature. The ability to instantly tally results will be very useful in organizations
where a large portion of the member ship is blind or visually impaired, as no manual counting
would be needed.
Furthermore, there are some blind accessible ARS systems currently on the market. The
ResponseCard Accessibility, manufactured by Turning Technologies, includes a vibration
feature that vibrates when the voters vote is counted. These ResponseCards can be purchased
from the Swedish company AV-Huset at a price of approximately US$130 per clicker. While
this is expensive, it is a proven technology that is readily available. A less expensive clicker
system, known as Reply, is distributed by a British company known as TeamTalk. One of
these systems, the Reply Mini, costs only US$35 per clicker. It does not, however, include
any accessibility features for the visually impaired. For this reason, if the Danish Association
of the Blind wishes to use the Reply Mini, we would recommend that they set up a demo
with TeamTalk first.
As previously mentioned in our report, we found that no ARS offers an audio feedback
feature on their clickers. The addition of this feature would allow visually impaired users of
the clickers to be certain in their vote, and would greatly improve the usability of the device.
We also believe that, because no audience response system provides audio feedback, there
exists an untapped market for ARS with such a feature. As including an audio feedback
system would be relatively inexpensive in the long run, we believe that doing so could be
a rewarding investment for the first company to create an ARS with one. We therefore
recommend that the Danish Association of the Blind push for the development of audience
response systems with an audio feedback system.
73
References
AEC (2010). Telephone voting for blind or low vision electors, 2010 federal election. Aus-
tralian Election Comission.
URL http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/federal_elections/2010/
Ariel J. Feldman, E. W. F., J. Alex Halderman (2006). Security analysis of the diebold
accuvote-ts voting machine. online.
Arthur M. Keller, J. L. H. A. U., David Mertz (2004). ”Privacy Issues in an Electronic
Voting Machine”.
Asociated Press (2009). Fewer blind Americans learning to use Braille. Online.
Barnea, M. F., & Schwartz, S. H. (1998). Values and voting. Political Psychology , 19 (1),
17–40.
Barnes, E. (2010). Internet voting arrives . . . but is it secret and secure? Online.
Blanc, J. (2007). Electronic voting. Challenging the Norms and Standards of Election
Administration, (pp. 11–19).
Blanger, F., & Carter, L. (2010). The digital divide and internet voting acceptance. In 2010
Fourth International Conference on Digital Society , (pp. 307–310). IEEE.
Brady, R. (2007). Report on the voter confidence and accesibility act of 2007. Committee
on House Administratio.
Buchstein, H. (2010). Public voting and political modernization: Different views from the
19th century. Private and Public Debate and Voting .
Byrne, K. S., M.D.;Greene (2007). Usability of voting systems: Baseline data for paper,
punch cards, and lever machines.
Christensen, L. (2000). The importance of information technology for visually impaired
children and youngsters and the expectations for future development. ICEVI Europe.
Comeau, T. (2010). Could phone and online voting be an option? online.
Cox, C. (2003). Touch the future of voting: Georgia’s guide to election reform. print.
DAB (2011). Danish Association of the Blind Webpage. online.
URL http://www.dkblind.dk/dab/
Dahl, R. (1998). On Democracy . Yale University Press.




Dean, D. G. (1960). Alienation and political apathy. Social Forces , 38 (3), 185–189.
Elklit, J., & Kjaer, U. (2009). Split-ticket voting in times of sub-national government reor-
ganisation: Evidence from denmark. Scandinavian Political Studies , 32 (4), 422–439.
ENEC (2009). Internet voting in estonia.
URL www.vvk.ee/engindex.html
European Commission (2009). Compendium of international standards for elections.
Evans, D., & Paul, N. (2004). Election security: perception and reality. Security & Privacy,
IEEE , 2 (1), 24–31.
Everett, S. P. (2007). The Usability of Electronic Voting Machines and How Votes Can Be
Changed Without Detection. Master’s thesis, Rice University.
Federal Constitutional Court Press office (2009). Use of voting computers in 2005 bundestag
election unconstitutional. Press Release.
Folketing (2011). Danish folketing website. Online.
URL http://www.ft.dk/
Gallagher, M. (2009). Voting in Denmark. Trinity College, Dublin, 2011 (1/21/2011).
George, A. (2003). Syria: Neither Bread nor Freedom. Zed Books.
Gideon, J. (2009). Testimony on h.b. 1624.
URL http://www.votersunite.org/Info/JohnWAInternetVot2009.pdf
Gouldner, A. W. (1950). Studies in leadership. Harper.
Grabenwarter, C. (2004). ”Report on the Compatibility of Remote Voting and Electronic
Voting with the Standards of the Council of Europe”. Venice Comission, 58 , 2.
Gritzalis, D. (2003). Secure Electronic Voting (Advances in Information Security). Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Hall, T. (2011). Internet voting in comparative perspective: the case of estonia. PS-Political
Science and Politics , 42 , 497–505.
Hall, T. E. (2001). Should Congress assert more control over local voting standards in
elections?
Harrington, J. C. (1999). Pencils Within Reach and a Walkman or Two: Making the
Secret Ballot Available to Voters Who Are Blind or Have Other Physical Disabilities
A Chronology of Litigation History, Theory, and Results. Tex.F.on CL & CR, 4 , 87–289.
Harry Hocheiser, J. J. C.-M. K. J. L., Ben Bederson (2005). The need for usability of
75
electronic voting systems: Questions for voters and policy makers. Tech. rep., Association
of Computing Machinery (ACM).
Headd, M. J. (2005). Enabling Telephone Voting to Enhance Participation and Voting
Opportunities for the Visually Impaired. print.
Heilbrunn, J. (2011). Interview with John Heilbrunn.
Henry E. Brady, M. J.-J. M., Justin Buchler (2001). Counting All the Votes: The Perfor-
mance of Voting Technology in the United States. Online.
Herrnson, P. S., Niemi, R. G., Hanmer, M. J., Bederson, B. B., Conrad, F. G., & Traugott,
M. (2006). The importance of usability testing of voting systems. In Proceedings of
the USENIX/Accurate Electronic Voting Technology Workshop 2006 on Electronic Voting
Technology Workshop, (pp. 3–3). USENIX Association.
House, F. (2011). Freedom in the world. Online.
URL http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15
Hursti, H. (2006). Diebold tsx evaluation. web.
Hutchinson, N. (2010). Blind can cast secret votes.
IIDEA (2001). Denmark ranks high in voter turnout among 170 global democracies. online.
URL http://archive.idea.int/press/pr20011120.htm
Jacobsen, G. (2008). Blind voter awarded $5000 for poll booth humiliation. Sydney Morning
Herald.
Jefferson, D., Rubin, A. D., Simons, B., & Wagner, D. (2004). Analyzing internet voting
security. Communications of the ACM , 47 (10), 59–64.
Jørgen Elklit, P. S., & Togeby, L. (2005). Why is voter turnout not declining in denmark?
Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, Denmark .
Kaminer, A. (2010). Democracy, the hard way. The New York Times .
Karp, J. A., & Banducci, S. A. (2000). Going postal: How all-mail elections influence
turnout. Political Behavior , 22 (3), 223.
Katsakis, A. (2005). ”Telephone Voting: An Accessible Step Forward”.
URL http://www.sath.org/index.php?sec=741&id=5020
Kristen K. Greene, M. D. B., & Everett, S. P. (2006). A comparison of usability between
voting methods. In Proceedings of the 2006 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting
Technology Workshop.
Libbenga, J. (2007). Dutch pull the plug on e-voting. Online.
76
URL http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/10/01/dutch_pull_plug_on_evoting/
Lipari, B. (2010). Internet voting an introduction. Online.
URL http://blog.verifiedvoting.org/2010/08/18/752
Local Government Chronicle (2001a). New survey reveals widespread voting hurdles for
disabled voters.
Local Government Chronicle (2001b). Voting gets easier for blind electors.
Marketwire (2010). ”Record Number of Ontario Municipalities to Use Internet and Telephone
Voting for 2010 Municipal Elections”. online.
Maxwel, K. (2004). Testimony before the u.s. election assistance commission.
Mercuri, R. (2002). A better ballot box? Spectrum, IEEE , 39 (10), 46–50.
Miller, K. E. (1964). The danish electoral system. Parliamentary Affairs , 18 (1), 71.
MISA (2009). Parliamentary electoral system in denmark. Ministry of the Interior and
Social Affairs .
Moran, B. (2008). Slideshow: A preview of the election ballots (and the potential problems).
Online.
URL http://vote2008.thetakeaway.org
Moynihan, D. (2004a). Building secure elections: E-voting, security, and systems theory.
Public Administration review , 64 , 515.
Moynihan, D. P. (2004b). Building Secure Elections: E-Voting, Security, and Systems The-
ory. Public Administration review , 64 , 515.
Myerson, R. (2005). Report on a survey of changes in total annual expenditures for florida
counties before and after purchase of touch screens and a comparison of total annual
expenditures for touch screens and optical scanners. online.
Nasrallah, J. (2011). Voter turnout in canada and denmark. Online.
New Media Age (2001). Enabling the disabled.
Ney, R. (2002). Comittee report on help america vote act of 2001.
Novick, A. (2009). ”The EAC Lied, Lever Voting Machines (Almost) Died”. online.
Office of the Secretary of State of Washington (2007). Washington State’s Vote-by-mail
Experience.
Piner, G. E., & Byrne, M. D. (????). Baseline usability data for a non-electronic approach
to accessible voting.
PR Newswire (2004). ”DC’s Blind Voters Will be Able to Vote Independently for the First
77
Time”.
Qvortrup, M. (2005). First past the postman: Voting by mail in comparative perspective.
The Political Quarterly .
Randell, B. (2006). Voting technologies and trust. Security & Privacy, IEEE , 4 (5), 50–56.
Rose, C., & Mejer, C. (2003). The danish corporate governance system: from stakeholder
orientation towards shareholder value. Corporate Governance: An International Review ,
11 (4), 335–344.
Saalfeld, T. (1995). On dogs and whips: Recorded votes. Parliaments and Majority Rule in
Western Europe, (p. 531).
Saltman, R. G., & SB134106W0703, O. N. (2006). Independent verification: Essential action
to assure integrity in the voting process. no.SB134106W0703, US Nat” l Inst.Standards
and Technology, Aug .
Sanchez-Palacios, J. (2000). Early Voting Begins Via Touch-Screen in County. Los Angeles
Times, Print.
Sastry, N., Kohno, T., & Wagner, D. (2006). Designing voting machines for verification. In
USENIX Security Symposium.
Schelling, T. (1981). The Strategy of Conflict . Harvard University Press.
Schneier, B. (2004). The problem with electronic voting machines. Online.
URL http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2004/11/the_problem_wit.html
Schnurr, J. (2010). Electronic voting creates problems across eastern Ontario. online.
Schriner, K., & Batavia, A. I. (2001). The americans with disabilities act: Does it secure
the fundamental right to vote? Policy Studies Journal , 29 (4), 663–673.
Schryen, G., & Volkamer, M. (2010). Measuring etrust in distributed systems general concept
and application to internet voting.
Schwartz, P. M. (2002). Voting technology and democracy.
Selsa, M. (2008). Trust in E-voting Systems.
Shamos, M. I. (2004). paper v. electronic voting records - an assessment.
Sørensen, M. (2008). Trust in E-voting Systems . Master’s thesis, IT University of Copen-
hagen.
The Center for Election Science (2011). New hampshire house bill 240.
URL http://www.electology.org/hb-240
UK Electoral Comission (2002). Week-long blitz of young brits in the electoral commission’s
78




US Census Bureau (2011). Voting-age populationreported registration and voting by selected
characteristics: 1996 to 2008. Online.
URL http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0416.pdf
USFEC (2000). Direct recording electronic systems. Online.
VisionAware (2010). How can I vote if I can’t see the ballot? Will touch screen voting
machines help? Online.
URL http://www.visionaware.org/HAVA
Wallach, D. S. (2005). Testimony before ohio joint committee on ballot security.
Waterstone, M. E. (2003). Constitutional and Statutory Voting Rights for People with
Disabilities. Stanford Law & Policy Review , 14 , 353.
Wolffsohn, J. S., & Cochrane, A. L. (2000). Design of the low vision quality-of-life ques-
tionnaire (lvqol) and measuring the outcome of low-vision rehabilitation* 1. American
Journal of Ophthalmology , 130 (6), 793–802.
Zetter, K. (2003). Aussies do it right: E-voting. Online.
79
Appendix A: Interview Request
Hello,
We are students from Worcester Polytechnic Institute, located in the United States,
working with the Danish Association of the Blind to improve voter privacy for the visually
impaired. We have already conducted a preliminary analysis on different methods of voting
used around the world, but would like to discuss these voting systems with visually impaired
voters in Denmark. To do this, we will be conducting a series of interviews and focus groups
during the week of March 28. If you are able to participate in either an interview or focus
group, we would greatly appreciate it.
Interviews will last from 20-30 minutes and be conducted throughout the entire week of
March 28, and on to the next week if needed. The focus group will consist of 6-15 participants
and last roughly 1 hour, however light refreshments will be provided. A specific date and
time will be determined when we see the dates and times that participants will be free.
Topics of discussion for the interviews and focus groups will include:
• Opinions on the current method of voting used in Denmark, and what can be done to
improve it.
• Opinions of different voting systems used throughout the world, and any comments,
concerns, or insights regarding such systems.
• How voting is conducted in organizations or corporations and how it can be improved.
If you would like to participate in either an interview or the focus group, please email us at
denmark11-voting@wpi.edu. Include a time and date that you would be able to participate,
as well as which type of discussion (interview, focus group, or both) you would be interested
in participating in. Anything said during the interview will be kept private, and will only











• Method of Contact:
Roles:




1. Visually Impaired Voting
• Do you feel that the current system provides you with an acceptable amount of
privacy?
• How do you feel that the current system could be improved?
• Do you feel that the previous system was acceptable?
• What do you feel is an acceptable amount of privacy?
• Have you felt discouraged from voting due to the level of privacy in the current
system?
2. Accessible Methods of Voting
• Braille
– Would you feel comfortable voting with a braille ballot?
– Do you feel that braille ballots or templates would be an acceptable solution
to the problem of visually impaired voter privacy?
• Electronic Voting Machines
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– Would you feel comfortable voting with an electronic voting machine?
– Would you feel more comfortable about using them if they produced a paper
trail?
– Do you believe that electronic voting system would be an acceptable solution?
• Telephonic Systems
– Do you believe that a telephone based voting system would provide an ac-
ceptable level of privacy?
– Would you feel comfortable voting with a telephone based voting system?
– Do you feel that a telephone based voting system of voting would be an
acceptable solution?
• Internet Based Systems
– Would you feel comfortable voting online?
– Do you feel that internet based voting would be an acceptable solution?
• Which of the above systems would you prefer? Why?
3. Voting Within Organizations
• How have you voted within organizations that you are a member of?
• Was this an acceptable method of voting?
• Would you feel comfortable using an audience response system in organizational
elections?
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Appendix C: Verbal Consent Form
To be read to all participants:
We are a group of students from Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Massachusetts. We
are conducting an interview among Danish voters and members of the Danish government to
learn about Danish perceptions of visually impaired accessible voting systems. We strongly
believe that this kind of research will help us to determine a method of voting that allows
visually impaired voters to vote privately and will be considered acceptable for use in Danish
elections.
Your participation in this survey is completely voluntary and you may withdraw at any
time. Please remember that your answers will remain anonymous. No names or identifying
information will appear on the questionnaires or in any of the project reports or publications.
This is a collaborative project between the Danish Association of the Blind and WPI,
and your participation is greatly appreciated. If interested, a copy of our results can be
provided at the conclusion of the study.
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